Integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) by Zimmerman, Brooke Maura
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-12
Integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment
incentives utilizing the Combinatorial Retention
Auction Mechanism (CRAM)
Zimmerman, Brooke Maura












INTEGRATING MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY 
REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES UTILIZING THE 









 Thesis Advisors:         William R. Gates 
                          Peter J. Coughlan 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering 
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Integrating Monetary and Non-
monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Brooke Zimmerman 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     




    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and 
do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. 
Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
    This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an 
optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence 
reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors by exploring three mechanisms 
for administrating enlisted retention:  a purely monetary auction, a Universal 
Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
(CRAM).   
    The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective 
strengths and weaknesses were explored.  CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP 
auctions.  Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives 
alone.  
    Additionally, this research addressed the force-diversifying potential of CRAM.  It 
was shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incentives changed 
the demographic mix of Sailors retained.  
    By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits which suit them, the Navy can
eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits while at the same time empowering 
its members. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
199 
14. SUBJECT TERMS retention, flexible benefits, auction, SRB, total 
rewards, non-monetary incentive, selective reenlistment bonus  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
INTEGRATING MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY REENLISTMENT 




Brooke M. Zimmerman 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., Old Dominion University, 1999 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Terry Rea, CAPT, USN 
Acting Dean, Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This research addressed the potential retention and 
cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized 
portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to 
influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted 
Sailors by exploring three mechanisms for administrating 
enlisted retention:  a purely monetary auction, a Universal 
Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).   
The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared 
and their respective strengths and weaknesses were 
explored.  CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP 
auctions.  Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25 to 80% 
over monetary incentives alone.  
Additionally, this research addressed the force-
diversifying potential of CRAM.  It was shown, for the 
sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incentives 
changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained.  
By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits 
which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste 
associated with unwanted benefits while at the same time 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................4 
1. Primary Question.................................................................................4 
2. Secondary Questions............................................................................4 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS........................................................................4 
D. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................5 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ......................................................................7 
II. AUCTION THEORY ..................................................................................................9 
A. COST OF RETENTION MECHANISM CURRENTLY USED BY 
THE NAVY.....................................................................................................10 
B. AUCTION DESIGN ......................................................................................12 
1. Auction Variations .............................................................................13 
a. Single-Winner Forward and Reverse Auctions .....................13 
b. Open-Bid vs. Sealed-Bid Auctions .........................................14 
c. Reverse Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction.............................14 
d. Bidding Strategy: Second-Price Auction ...............................15 
e. Bidding Strategy: First-Price Auction ...................................19 
f. Revenue Equivalence..............................................................20 
C. PRIOR THESIS WORK ...............................................................................21 
III. DETERMINING OFFERINGS................................................................................25 
A. CORPORATE NON-MONETARY INCENTIVE EFFORTS..................26 
1. Total Rewards ....................................................................................26 
2. Navy-Civilian Comparison Message ................................................27 
3. Example: The Royal Bank of Scotland ............................................29 
4. Employee Satisfaction, Communication and Distributive 
Justice..................................................................................................31 
B. CONFRONTING THE COMPLEXITY OF INCENTIVE CHOICES ...34 
C. IDENTIFYING THE BEST NON-MONETARY INCENTIVE 
OFFERINGS ..................................................................................................40 
1.  Results of Previous Conjoint Analysis .............................................40 
2. The “Mix”...........................................................................................42 
IV. ENLISTED RETENTION SURVEY.......................................................................49 
A. TARGET POPULATION AND METHODS OF CONTACT ..................49 
B.   RATING INFORMATION...........................................................................51 
1. Air Traffic Controller........................................................................51 
2. Fire Controlman.................................................................................51 
C. POPULATION STATISTICS ......................................................................52 
D. RESULTS .......................................................................................................54 
1. Distribution of Non-Monetary Incentive Values.............................54 
2. Reasons for Accepting or Rejecting the SRB ..................................59 
 viii
a. Reasons for Accepting the SRB..............................................59 
b. Reasons for Declining the SRB..............................................62 
3. Respondent Retention Suggestions...................................................65 
E. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................70 
V. RETENTION MECHANISM ALTERNATIVES ..................................................71 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................71 
B. MONETARY RETENTION INCENTIVES ALONE................................72 
1. Predetermined Incentive Amount ....................................................72 
2. Determined via Auction.....................................................................73 
a. Open vs. Sealed-Bid Format...................................................74 
b. First-Price vs. Second-Price ...................................................74 
c. Cost Equivalence of Auction Types........................................76 
3. Second-Price Retention Auction Example.......................................78 
C. UNIVERSAL INCENTIVE PACKAGE (UIP)...........................................78 
1. Description and Purpose ...................................................................78 
2. Determining which Incentives to Include ........................................79 
3. Optimal Universal NMI Package .....................................................80 
a. Description ..............................................................................80 
b. Problem: Truthful Revelation ................................................81 
4. Including NMI based on Sailor Feedback .......................................81 
a. Value More or Less than Cost ................................................81 
b. Relevant Population................................................................81 
c. Determining Usage Rate.........................................................82 
5. Potential Benefits and Limitations ...................................................83 
D. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM 
(CRAM) ..........................................................................................................85 
1. Overview .............................................................................................85 
2. Process Description............................................................................85 
3. Process Example.................................................................................87 
4. The Advantage of CRAM..................................................................88 
VI. SIMULATION DESIGN AND RESULTS ..............................................................91 
A. DESIGN ..........................................................................................................91 
1. General................................................................................................91 
2. Monetary Only Simulation................................................................93 
3. UIP Simulation...................................................................................93 
4. CRAM Simulation .............................................................................97 
5. Simulation Runs .................................................................................98 
B. RESULTS .......................................................................................................99 
1. Varying Percentile (AP) Cost Results ............................................100 
2. Varying Percentile (HP) Cost Results ............................................102 
C. THE CRAM ADVANTAGE.......................................................................104 
VII. LINKING PREFERENCES TO DIVERSITY .....................................................107 
A. MOTIVATION ............................................................................................107 
B. STATISTICAL REPRESENTATION DEFINED ...................................108 
 ix
C. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY .....................................................................109 
D. SOCIAL EQUITY .......................................................................................111 
E. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS.................................................................114 
F. ACCESSION REPRESENTATION VERSUS FORCE 
REPRESENTATION ..................................................................................116 
G. CRAM’S FORCE-DIVERSIFICATION POTENTIAL..........................117 
1. Gender...............................................................................................118 
2. Race/Ethnicity ..................................................................................119 
a. African American..................................................................120 
b. Hispanic.................................................................................120 
3.  Education..........................................................................................121 
4. Age.....................................................................................................122 
H. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................123 
VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................125 
A. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................125 
B. CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................................127 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................................127 
1. Implementation ................................................................................127 
2. Further Research .............................................................................129 
D. A FINAL WORD .........................................................................................129 
APPENDIX A. ENLISTED RETENTION SURVEY.............................................131 
APPENDIX B. SRB AND NMI VALUE DISTRIBUTIONS .................................141 
APPENDIX C. VARYING PERCENTILE (ALL POSITIVE) COST 
SIMULATION RESULTS ......................................................................................147 
APPENDIX D. VARYING PERCENTILE COST (HIGH POSITIVE) 
SIMULATION RESULTS ......................................................................................157 
APPENDIX E. DIVERSITY CHARTS....................................................................167 
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................173 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................179 
 
 x









LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Cost of Existing SRB Determination..............10 
Figure 2. Predetermined SRB Challenges....................11 
Figure 3. Auction Variations (From Coughlan, Introduction 
to Auction Economics)...........................12 
Figure 4. Common Auction Variations (From Coughlan, 
Introduction to Auction Economics)..............13 
Figure 5. Bidding Above Your Valuation (From Coughlan, 
Introduction to Auction Economics)..............16 
Figure 6. Bidding Below Your Valuation(From Coughlan, 
Introduction to Auction Economics)..............18 
Figure 7. Components of a Total Rewards Philosophy (From 
Corporate Leadership Council, Total Rewards 
Philosophy Components and Statements)...........26 
Figure 8. Advantages to RBS Flexible Benefits Plan (From 
Corporate Leadership Council, Royal Bank of 
Scotland’s Flexible Benefits Package)...........30 
Figure 9. Retirement Incentive Scorecard (After Military 
Compensation Reform)............................45 
Figure 10. Basic Pay Scorecard (After Military 
Compensation Reform)............................46 
Figure 11. Projected CRAM Scorecard (After Military 
Compensation Reform)............................47 
Figure 12. Value Distribution for Telecommuting............57 
Figure 13. Reasons for Accepting the SRB...................60 
Figure 14. Reasons for Declining the SRB...................62 
Figure 15. Open Comments...................................65 
Figure 16. Disadvantages of a Predetermined SRB Level......73 
Figure 17. Cost-Equivalence of First and Second-Price 
Auctions (After Coughlan et al., CRAM 
Presentation)...................................76 
Figure 18. Cost vs. Value of Non-Monetary Incentives 
(After Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)......79 
Figure 19. Non-Monetary Incentives Portfolio (After 
Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation).............80 
Figure 20. Value Distribution for One Year Sabbatical......83 
Figure 21. Limitations of a Universal Incentive Package 
(After Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)......84 
Figure 22. Enlisted Retention Example:  CRAM  (After 
Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation).............87 
Figure 23. CRAM overcomes the Universal Package Weakness 
(After Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)......89 
Figure 24. Optimal UIP Cutoff Percentile...................94 
Figure 25. Average Dollar Savings – VP(AP)................101 
 xii
Figure 26. Average Percent Savings – VP(AP)...............102 
Figure 27. Limitations of a Universal Incentive Package 
(After Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation).....103 
Figure 28. Average Dollar Savings VP(HP)..................104 
Figure 29. Percent Savings VP(HP).........................105 
Figure 30. Black Representation with CRAM.................120 
Figure 31. Hispanic Representation with CRAM..............121 
Figure 32. Education Level Representation with CRAM.......121 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Population and Sample Statistics................53 
Table 2. Average Reservation Values for Respondents......55 
Table 3. Reservation Value Percentiles...................58 
Table 4. Simulation Varieties............................93 
Table 5. Optimal UIP Cutoff Percentiles..................95 
Table 6. Varying Cost Percentiles for NMI Cost Estimates100 
Table 7. Gender Representation with CRAM................119 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AC  Air Traffic Controller (Navy rating) 
ACOL  Annualized Cost of Leaving 
AFQT  Armed Forces Qualification Test 
BAH  Basic Allowance for Housing 
BAS   Basic Allowance for Subsistence 
CBO  Congressional Budget Office 
CIWS  Close-In Weapon System 
CLC  Corporate Leadership Council 
CNP  Chief of Naval Personnel 
CRAM  Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
DOD  Department of Defense 
DON  Department of the Navy 
EAOS  End of Active Obligated Service 
FC  Fire Controlman (Navy rating) 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
MOE  Measure of Effectiveness 
NEC  Navy Enlisted Classification 
NMI  Non-Monetary incentive 
NPC   Navy Personnel Command 
OPTEMPO Operational Tempo (how often a unit deploys) 




QOL  Quality of Life 
QOS   Quality of Service 
RBS  Royal Bank of Scotland 
SRB  Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
SWO  Surface Warfare Officer 
TAD  Temporary Additional Duty 
UIP  Universal Incentive Package 
USMC  United States Marine Corps 
VP(AP) Varying Percentile Cost (all positive) 
VP(HP) Varying Percentile Cost (high positive) 
WTA  Willingness to Accept 
WTP  Willingness to Pay 
 xvii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Navy Total Force (N132) for 
sponsoring this research and Wayne Wagner (N1Z) for his 
coordination and assistance. 
Thank you to my advisors, Dr. Bill Gates and Dr. Pete 
Coughlan.  Your amazing insights and brilliant ideas 
inspired me.  Thanks for putting up with my obsessiveness! 
Many thanks to those who have supported my efforts:  
Thank you to Sarah Martin for tackling mountains of data 
and creating beautiful charts.  Thank you to Joy Newman, 
Janis Higginbotham, and Donna Cuadrez for your tireless 
technical efforts editing and formatting this thesis.  
Thank you to ETCM (SW/AW) Ferber who provided extensive 
data and expertise; to the many individuals at NPC who took 
time out of their day to answer the seemingly endless 
questions I sent; to the 150+ Command Master Chiefs 
throughout the fleet who ensured the timely turnaround of 
the survey; and, of course, to the Sailors who provided 
such valuable data and insight. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family:  Mom, thank 
you for telling and showing me my whole life that I could 
be anything I wanted.  Dad, thank you for giving me your 
love of learning and unquenchable thirst for knowledge.  
Russ, thank for all of the times you have pulled me out of 
a “funk.”  Jason, thank you for being a great sounding-
board for my ideas and for being an even better friend.   
Brian and Ian, you are my heart, my life.  I couldn’t 
have made it without your love and support.  Thank you for 
being “my boys.” 
 xviii
 




Don’t tell me what you value, show me your budget 
and I’ll tell you what you value. 
 -author unknown  
A. PURPOSE 
This research will address the potential retention and 
cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized 
portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to 
influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted 
Sailors. 
Although the idea of flexible benefits packages has 
been present in corporate America since the early sixties 
and gained popularity by the early eighties,1 it is a very 
recent idea to the U.S. Navy.  The military benefits’ 
package has long been characterized by a diverse set of 
benefits designed to include everything any Sailor might 
want. It also provides numerous “benefits” that many 
Sailors do not need, desire, or use.  To paraphrase the 
Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP), VADM Mark E. Ferguson’s 
comment at the 2008 Navy Workforce Research Conference:  
Why are we giving childcare benefits to an 18-year-old 
single Sailor with no dependents?2 
By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits that 
suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with 
                     
1 Michel Tremblay, Bruno Sire, Annie Pelchat. 1998. “A Study of the 
Determinants and of the Impact of Flexibility on Employee Benefits 
Satisfaction,” Human Relations 51, no. 5 (May 1): 667-688. 
http://www.proquest.com (accessed July 20, 2008). 
2 Mark E. Ferguson, VADM, USN, “Keynote Speaker,” (Eighth Annual Navy 
Workforce and Research Conference, Rosslyn, Virginia, May 5, 2008). 
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unwanted benefits while at the same time empowering its 
members by giving them a voice in their compensation 
structures. 
The Navy attempts to obtain desired end-strength by 
balancing personnel losses with accessions and retention.  
The retention of qualified experienced Sailors has 
historically been considered a more cost-effective option 
than to recruit and train new accessions to replace those 
losses -- especially those “in critical skill specialties 
with high training costs or demonstrated retention 
shortfalls.”3  The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) 
“provides a bonus to enlisted personnel who reenlist in a 
skill characterized by inadequate manning, low retention, 
and high replacement costs payable to an individual with 
between twenty-one months and sixteen years active service.  
Payment is based on monthly basic pay times a specified 
award level … times the number of additional years of 
obligated service.”4  
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), the Department of Defense’s budget “for the 
Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program has more than tripled 
… from $235 million in fiscal year 1997 to an estimated 
                     
3 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, Military Compensation Background Papers, 6th ed.  
(Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office: 2005), 610.  
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Military_Comp.pdf (accessed October 
25, 2008). 
4 U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2009 Budget Estimates Submission, Justification of Estimates, 
February 2008, Military Personnel, Navy (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008), 85. 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/09PRES/MPN_Book.pdf (accessed: 
November 6, 2008). 
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$789 million in fiscal year 2002.”5  The Navy’s portion of 
the SRB funds was estimated at $323 million in 2007, $358 
million in 2008, and $359 million in 2009.6  According to a 
GAO study in 2005, “[m]ost [service] components … met their 
aggregate retention goals in the past 6 fiscal years [2000-
2005], but the Navy experienced retention shortages in 
fiscal year 2005 … The Navy did not meet its end-of-year 
retention goals: for service members with less than 6 years 
of service by about 2 percent and for service members with 
6 to 10 years of service by about 8 percent.”7  They further 
assert:  “The fact that over 112,000 positions [DoD-wide] 
in consistently under-filled occupational specialties were 
vacant in fiscal year 2005 raises concerns about whether 
the authorized personnel levels for these occupational 
specialties are based on valid requirements.”8 
Thus, the Navy is paying significantly more money in 
SRBs and still not consistently meeting its retention 
goals.  It also puts itself in a position to have to 
                     
5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel:  
Management and Oversight of Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs 
Improvement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), 5. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03149.pdf (accessed: February 17, 2008). 
6 U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2009 Budget Estimates Submission, Justification of Estimates, 
February 2008, Military Personnel, Navy (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008), 85. 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/09PRES/MPN_Book.pdf (accessed: 
November 6, 2008). 
7 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel: DOD 
Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel Recruitment and 
Retention Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2005), 8 and 11. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03149.pdf (accessed: 
February 17, 2008). 
8 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel: DOD 
Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel Recruitment and 
Retention Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2005), 22. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03149.pdf (accessed: February 
17, 2008).  
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justify current manning levels.  The system is broken and 
needs to be fixed.  This research will explore one possible 
“fix.” 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research addressed the following questions: 
1. Primary Question 
Can a combinatorial auction mechanism providing 
individualized portfolios of non-monetary and monetary 
incentives provide a more cost-effective means to influence 
reenlistment/retention behavior than monetary incentives 
alone? 
2. Secondary Questions 
a. What mix of monetary/non-monetary incentives would 
be both valued by Sailors and cost-effective for the Navy? 
b. What auction design would allow the Navy to tailor 
monetary/non-monetary reenlistment incentive packages to 
individual Sailors while simultaneously economizing on Navy 
resources? 
c. If both reenlistment incentive programs are 
optimally designed, what cost savings might the Navy expect 
by moving from purely monetary reenlistment incentives to a 
portfolio of monetary/non-monetary incentives? 
d. How would population representation be affected by 
these reenlistment incentives? 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS  
This thesis focused on applying non-monetary 
incentives in a retention auction mechanism to U.S. Navy 
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Sailor reenlistments.  It did not address other services 
nor did it specifically analyze officer retention. The 
findings, however, may be applicable to all services at any 
pay grade.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology in this study included both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses.   
This thesis focused on exploring three mechanisms for 
administrating enlisted retention:  a purely monetary 
auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and 
the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  The 
latter two auctions included various non-monetary 
incentives (NMIs) that appeared to be important to Sailors 
based on prior research as well as survey research 
conducted as part of this thesis.   
The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes 
compared, and their respective strengths and weaknesses 
explored.  The main measure of effectiveness (MOE) was 
total cost to the Navy. This assumed constant reenlistment 
goals across mechanisms.  The models, however, can easily 
be adapted to reflect a constant total cost assumption with 
increasing/decreasing retention rate as the MOE.   
As part of a prior NPS student project, a survey was 
recently conducted asking Surface Warfare Officers what 
amount of money they would require to agree to stay in the 
Navy for two additional tours as Department Heads.  They 
were then asked how much of that money they would be 
willing to give up for certain non-monetary benefits.  The 
results showed the top non-monetary compensation attracters 
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for Surface Warfare Officers to be: increased graduate 
education opportunities, guaranteed base housing, 
geographic stability, leave sabbatical (for education and 
pregnancy), telecommuting, and additional money for 
dependents (education and daycare). 
This current thesis conducted a similar non-monetary 
incentive survey targeting enlisted personnel, specifically 
the Air Traffic Controller (AC) and Fire Controlman (FC) 
ratings in the Navy.  Appendix A contains a copy of the 
full Enlisted Retention Survey. 
Information about the Sailors’ valuation distributions 
for various non-monetary incentives, which was required to 
run the simulations, was not available.  Thus, the survey 
was administered to obtain the necessary data.  The survey 
method chosen provided quick turnaround time, ease of data 
collection, and uniformity of response format. 
The data obtained from the Enlisted Retention Survey 
was used in the simulations to estimate the performance of 
the three retention auctions.  There is little to no 
information currently available regarding the cost to the 
Navy of the NMIs offered.  The cost of the offerings was 
estimated based on the value distributions gleaned from the 
survey responses. 
A mathematical simulation of the three auctions was 
created using Microsoft Excel and Oracle Crystal Ball.  The 
model predicted individual retention outcomes, benefits 
received, total, and per-Sailor cost to the Navy for the 
monetary-only, UIP, and CRAM auctions. 
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Two cost estimation techniques, which were labeled 
Varying Percentile cost - All Positive (VP(AP)) and Varying 
Percentile cost – High Positive (VP(HP)), which will be 
described in Chapter VI, were used to ensure thorough cost 
estimation and future applicability of the analysis. 
The final product is a program that is applicable to 
any community (enlisted or officer, surface or aviation) by 
simply changing the offerings and associated reservation 
values. 
Three survey questions provided the respondents an 
opportunity to answer in an open text format.  Chapter IV 
summarizes and discusses these responses. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 This research is a continuation of Drs. Pete Coughlan 
and William Gates’ on-going investigation into the cost-
effectiveness of offering monetary/non-monetary 
reenlistment retention packages, or flexible benefits 
packages, to naval personnel.  Previous student theses 
addressed many of the initial design questions that will be 
included in the literature review.   
While there does not appear to be any published 
studies directly on-point with this research, discussions 
of other key questions surrounding this study were found in 
the published literature. 
The key questions to be answered were: 
1. What is the right mechanism for allocating 
compensation offerings?  What auction design 
would best suit this purpose?  Would 
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participants respond to these mechanisms 
appropriately? (Chapter II). 
2. How have civilian corporations pursued and 
implemented flexible benefits offerings? 
(Chapter III). 
3. Can individuals handle the complexities and 
volume of decisions required for flexible 
benefits auctions? (Chapter III). 
4. What offerings would be most desired by Navy 
personnel?  What is the feasibility of these 
offerings? (Chapter III). 
5. What subgroup of Naval Personnel should be 
examined for this research? (Chapter IV). 
Chapter IV also addresses the Enlisted Retention 
Survey administration, target population, sample 
statistics, and open text responses.  Chapter V outlines 
the auction mechanisms’ format and implementation.  Chapter 
VI presents the auction simulations and results.  Chapter 
VII discusses potential diversity implications of the CRAM.  




II. AUCTION THEORY 
Presently the size or amounts of the Selected 
Reenlistment Bonuses are predetermined in “response to 
market forces as retention changes in ratings, NECs, and 
skills.”9  Specifically, planners at the Naval Bureau of 
Personnel determine which ratings and Navy Enlisted 
Classifications (NECs) qualify as undermanned, suffering 
from low retention or have high replacement costs. They 
then determine the level of cash bonus at which the Navy 
can expect “a reasonable prospect of enough improvement in 
retention in response to the award to justify the cost.”10  
This determination is made primarily through use of the 
Annualized Cost of Leaving Model (ACOL). This model 
theorizes that individuals compare their projected Military 
earnings stream with their possible civilian earnings 
stream plus their taste for civilian life to determine 
whether to continue military service.11  By using this 
model, planners derive the estimated minimum SRB amount 
that would induce the requisite number of Sailors to stay 
in the Navy.   
                     
9 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), OPNAVINST 1160.8A, Department of 
the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
2007). 
10 CNO, OPNAVINST 1160.8A. 
11 Michael L. Hansen and Jennie W. Wenger, “Is the Pay Responsiveness 
of Enlisted Personnel Decreasing?” Defence and Peace Economics 16, no.1 
(2005): 33.  Hansen and Wenger suggest including “basic pay, allowances 
for subsistence and housing, and retirement pay .... [and any] SRB for 
which the individual is eligible.” 
A. COST OF RETENTION MECHANISM CURRENTLY USED BY THE NAVY 
By using a predetermined SRB amount as described 
above, the Navy planners are actually attempting to 
determine the marginal SRB required by the final (or most 
reluctant) Sailor that must reenlist to meet end-strength.  
Unfortunately, all previous (or more-willing) Sailors must 
also receive this amount under the current system, as shown 
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Figure 1.   Cost of Existing SRB Determination 
If planners underestimate the optimal SRB level, i.e., 
set the bonus too low, there will not be enough Sailors who 
are willing to retain, the Navy will not meet end-strength 
goals, and readiness will suffer.  If planners overestimate 
the optimal SRB level, i.e., set the bonus too high, too 
many Sailors will be willing to retain and the Navy could 
overshoot end-strength. This would result in budget 
overages.  Alternatively, if the bonus was set above the 
optimal SRB level, reenlistments could be suspended once 
end-strength was reached.  This would be sub-optimal as 
retention would be based on a first-come basis, heavily 
favoring those whose end of active obligated service (EAOS) 
falls in the first half of the fiscal year. This would not 
only be potentially unfair to those with later EAOS dates, 
but it would not retain those Sailors (regardless of EAOS 
date) who are most willing to remain in the Navy. This 
would potentially raise later retention costs. 
The green line in Figure 2 represents the labor supply 
curve or Sailors’ reservation costs to remain in the Navy.  
The blue line represents the optimal SRB.  The two red 
lines illustrate the result of setting the SRB level too 
high or too low.  
Optimal SRB









Figure 2.   Predetermined SRB Challenges 
This thesis will illustrate an auction mechanism that 
endogenously determines the precise (and minimum) SRB level 
necessary to induce the right number of reenlistments and 
overcome the flaws of the current system. Theoretically, a 
retention auction would not only set the market clearing 
SRB level that is appropriate for the current labor supply 
11 
and demand conditions, but would also identify which 
individual Sailors are to be retained. 
B. AUCTION DESIGN 
The Encarta Dictionary defines an auction as, “a sale 
of goods or property at which intending buyers bid against 
one another for individual items, each of which is sold to 
the bidder offering the highest price.”  This actually 
defines the most widely understood auction:  a forward 
auction.  There are numerous variations on this common type 
of auction, some of which will be discussed in the 











Figure 3.   Auction Variations (From Coughlan, Introduction 
to Auction Economics)12 
                     
12 
12 Peter J. Coughlan, “Introduction to Auction Economics,” (lecture, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, November 29, 2004). 
An auction is, more precisely, “an exchange 
mechanism”13 that allocates resources to the winning bidder.  
Whether the winner is buying or selling, how many winners 
there are, and the price the winner pays or receives is 
determined by the auction variation. 
1. Auction Variations 
This section will discuss some of the most common 
auction variations, specifically those germane to this 
research.  Additionally, an introduction to the 
combinatorial auction, which is less common, will be 
provided. 
Reverse AuctionsForward Auctions







Figure 4.   Common Auction Variations (From Coughlan, 
Introduction to Auction Economics)14 
a. Single-Winner Forward and Reverse Auctions 
In a forward single-winner auction, there is one 
seller and multiple buyers.  The winner is the highest 
bidder.  This is the most widely known type of auction.  A 
                     
13 Peter J. Coughlan, “Introduction to Auction Economics.” 
13
14 Peter J. Coughlan, “Introduction to Auction Economics.” 
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reverse single-winner auction is characterized by multiple 
sellers and one buyer.  An example of this is the 
competition for government contracts.  The winner is the 
lowest bidder.  
For simplicity, the following auction types will 
be described using a forward single-winner auction -- 
unless otherwise noted. 
b. Open-Bid vs. Sealed-Bid Auctions 
Open-bid auctions are those in which bidders 
openly declare their bid amounts or intentions.  Open bid 
auctions can be ascending (English auction).  The bidding 
starts at a minimum price and the auctioneer increases the 
bid incrementally until there are no more takers.  They can 
also be descending (Dutch auctions).  The auctioneer starts 
at a predetermined price (high enough so that no bidder is 
interested) and decreases incrementally until a bidder 
accepts that price. 
Sealed bid auctions are those in which bid 
amounts are submitted (often in a roughly simultaneous 
fashion) without any disclosure until after the winner is 
determined. Sealed bid auctions come in two common 
variations.  In a first-price auction, the winner is the 
highest bidder and he pays the amount he bid.  In a second-
price (Vickrey) auction, the winner is still the highest 
bidder.  The price he pays, however, is the bid of the next 
highest bidder.   
c. Reverse Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction 
Given the retention context, this thesis will be 
focusing on reverse auctions.  In a reverse auction there 
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is only one buyer (for example, the Navy) and many sellers 
(the Sailors offering their services) who are also the 
bidders. 
While the results of this thesis generalize to 
other reverse auction formats, the focus will be on reverse 
second-price sealed-bid auctions. In a reverse second-price 
auction, the lowest bidder provides the goods or services 
(in this case, military labor), but at the price of the 
first excluded (next highest) bidder. 
There will be further discussion of the specific 
auction formats analyzed in Chapter IV.  
d. Bidding Strategy: Second-Price Auction  
Under a second-price auction, the optimal bidding 
strategy is to bid one’s true valuation. For example, if an 
individual is bidding for an item which is worth $30 to him 
(he would be willing to pay a maximum of $30 for the item), 
then his best strategy is to bid exactly $30 for the item 
in a second-price auction. 
To understand this result more clearly, this 
section will illustrate how one can never do better than 
bidding truthfully in a second-price auction. For 
simplicity, the explanation that follows employs the 
following notation: 
V = Your value for the object 
P = Price paid for the object 
S = Your surplus 
B = Your bid for the object 
H = Highest bid submitted by any other bidder 
The following section will first demonstrate that 
bidding above your true value (i.e., choosing B > V) can 
only hurt you.  It will then demonstrate that bidding below 
your true value (i.e., choosing B < V) can only hurt you. 
Figure 5 illustrates the three possible cases or outcomes 
which can result from bidding above your true value. Figure 
6 illustrates the three possible cases or outcomes which 
can result from bidding below your true value. 
 
Figure 5.   Bidding Above Your Valuation (From Coughlan, 
Introduction to Auction Economics)15 
For all cases, the reader should note that your 
objective as a bidder is to maximize your surplus, S.  If 
you do not submit the highest bid (i.e., if B < H), then S 
= 0.  If you do submit the highest bid (i.e., if B > H), 
then P = H and your surplus is given by S = V – P = V – H. 
                     
16
15 Peter J. Coughlan, “Introduction to Auction Economics.” 
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Case A1: H > B > V 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high 
bidder and you do not win the object; therefore S = 0.  If 
you bid truthfully (B = V), you also do not win the object 
(because H > V) and, therefore, would also have S = 0.  
Thus, bidding above your true value provides no benefit in 
this case. 
Case A2: B > V > H 
In this case, because B > H, you are the high 
bidder and win the object; therefore S = V – H > 0.  If you 
bid truthfully (B = V), you also win the object (because V 
> H) and, therefore, would also have S = V - H.  Thus, 
bidding above your true value provides no benefit in this 
case, either. 
Case A3: B > H > V 
In this case, because B > H, you are the high 
bidder and win the object; therefore S = V – H, which is 
negative, because H > V:  you “win” the object, but pay 
more than it is worth to you.  If you bid truthfully (B = 
V), on the other hand, you would not win the object 
(because H > V) and, therefore, would have S = 0.  Thus, 
bidding above your true value hurts you in this case.  You 
would be better off bidding truthfully. 
  
Figure 6.   Bidding Below Your Valuation(From Coughlan, 
Introduction to Auction Economics)16 
Case B1: H > V > B 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high 
bidder and do not win the object; therefore S = 0.  If you 
bid truthfully (B = V), you also do not win the object 
(because H > V) and, therefore, would also have S = 0. 
Bidding below your true value provides no benefit in this 
case. 
Case B2: V > B > H 
In this case, because B > H, you are the high 
bidder and win the object; therefore S = V – H > 0.  If you 
bid truthfully (B = V), you also win the object (because V 
> H) and, therefore, would also have S = V – H.  Thus, 
bidding below your true value provides no benefit in this 
case. 
                     
18
16 Peter J. Coughlan, “Introduction to Auction Economics.” 
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Case B3: V > H > B 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high 
bidder and do not win the object; therefore S = 0.  If you 
bid truthfully (B = V), you would win the object (because V 
> H) and, therefore, would have S = V – H. This is positive 
because V > H.  Thus, bidding below your true value hurts 
you in this case.  You would be better off bidding 
truthfully. 
This demonstrates that bidding anything other 
than your true value in a second-price auction can only 
hurt you.  Under this auction format, truthful revelation 
(B = V) is the optimal bidding strategy. 
e. Bidding Strategy: First-Price Auction  
Under a first-price auction, it is immediately 
apparent that truthful revelation (B = V) is NOT the 
optimal bidding strategy. If you are the high bidder (i.e., 
if B > H) under a first-price auction, you will win the 
object but the price you pay will be the amount you bid 
(i.e., P = B).  Therefore, you will earn no surplus (S = V 
– P = V – B = V – V = 0).  Instead, the optimal strategy is 
to bid some amount below your true value (i.e., to bid B < 
V). 
By how much should you “underbid” your true value 
in a first-price auction? To answer this question, consider 
that if all bidders underbid their true values by the same 
fraction or amount (or, more generally, according to the 
same underbidding or discounting rule), the winning bidder 
will always be the bidder with the highest value for the 
object. 
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Because S = V – P = V – B only if you win the 
object and S = 0 otherwise, the amount you bid only matters 
if you win the object. This means that you might as well 
bid as if you are the winning bidder, i.e., the bidder with 
the highest value for the object. 
Identifying the optimal bidding strategy in a 
first-price auction boils down to answering the following 
question:  if you have the highest value for the object 
among all bidders, how low can you bid and still win the 
object?  The answer is that you can bid as low as the 
second highest bid, which you can safely assume will be at 
or below the second highest value for the object.  Thus, 
the optimal bidding strategy (technically, the 
“equilibrium” bidding strategy) in a first-price auction is 
to bid what you expect the next highest value would be if 
your value for the object was the highest value among all 
bidders. 
f. Revenue Equivalence  
One interesting and important implication of the 
above-described optimal bidding strategies is that, on 
average, the seller of the object can expect to receive the 
same revenue -- whether the object is sold via first-price 
or second-price auction. 
To see this, note that the price (or revenue) in 
a second-price auction will be equal to the second-highest 
bid.  Because the optimal bidding strategy is to bid 
truthfully, this will be equal to the second-highest value.  
Under a first-price auction, the price (or revenue) will be 
equal to the absolute highest bid.  In equilibrium, the 
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high bidder in a first-price auction will bid what he 
expects to be the second-highest value. 
Thus, under either auction format, the expected 
price is equal to the expected second-highest valuation.  
Thus, in general, the expected revenue for the seller under 
either auction format is the same. 
C. PRIOR THESIS WORK 
Major Hudson’s thesis addresses the choice between a 
first and second-price auction design with respect to the 
Navy’s Targeted Separation Incentive Program in 2006.  He 
determined that the second-price sealed bid auction “is the 
most efficient manner to conduct separation auctions 
because of its efficiency, cost effectiveness, equitability 
and practicality, based on recent market design and auction 
theory.”17   
Captain Bock’s thesis applied an auction mechanism to 
Marine Corps Reenlistments with the Sequential Self 
Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM).  He demonstrated the 
potential cost savings when Selected Reenlistment Bonus 
levels can be properly determined.18   
Ms. Tan’s thesis applied auction theory to Assignment 
Incentive Pay through the use of a simulation that 
incorporated a Sailor-job matching component.  When the 
 
17 Daniel P. Hudson, “Utilizing Auctions as a Force Shaping Tool to 
Provide Voluntary Separation Incentives to Naval Personnel,” (Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 38. 
18 Paul B. Bock, “The Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism for 
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses:  Potential Cost Savings to the U.S. 
Marine Corps,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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model designed was Sailor-optimal, she found that the 
second-price auction mechanism was most efficient.19 
Major Norton’s thesis designed an experiment to 
determine whether a second price auction design would be 
truth revealing in a retention scenario.  It was also 
designed to determine whether participants would be able to 
accurately determine their optimal bidding strategy without 
prior training and education on the subject.20  Captain 
Cook’s Thesis analyzed these experiments and found that 
most participants initially overbid their salary 
requirements, but quickly determined the most beneficial 
strategy (truthful revelation) and adopted it 
consistently.21  
The work of Lieutenants Denmond, Johnson, Lewis, and 
Lieutenant Commander Zegley built upon the previous studies 
and applied a combinatorial auction mechanism to Navy 
Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) retention.  They incorporated 
non-monetary incentives in conjunction with a portion of 
the pecuniary bonus already offered.  They found that the 
auction mechanism continued to provide cost savings to the 
Navy and adding the non-monetary incentives, in lieu of a 
portion of the original bonus, increased those savings 
 
19 Pei Yin Tan, “Simulating the Effectiveness of an Alternative 
Salary Auction Mechanism,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2006). 
20 William J. Norton, “Using an Experimental Approach to Improving 
the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program,” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007). 
21 Benjamin M. Cook, “Using a Second-Price Auction to Set Military 
retention Bonus Levels:  An Application to the Australian Army,” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
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while preserving much of the SWOs’ surplus value.22  The 
research that follows builds on this final thesis and will 
be explained in detail in Chapters IV, V, and VI. 
 
 
22 Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis, and 
Christopher R. Zegley, “Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the 
Selection of Surface Warfare Incentives,” (MBA professional report, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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III. DETERMINING OFFERINGS 
The major advantage to a solely pecuniary compensation 
system is its simplicity:  cash pay is easy to identify and 
quantify.  Few compensation plans, however, are this 
simple.  It is to the employee’s advantage to have a 
portion of his wages consist of non-monetary benefits.  
Savings achieved through economies of scale and corporate 
tax deductions in health care plans is an example.  Paid 
vacation and sick days are another example of non-cash 
benefits that work to the advantage of the employee.  Ms. 
Hattiangadi notes that in 2000 “nearly 80 percent of 
surveyed workers say that benefits are very important in 
their decision to accept or reject a job.”23  According to 
the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, the percentage of 
employees in medium and large companies with access to 
flexible benefits increased from 5% in 1988 to 13% in 
1999.24  In 2006, that number had risen to 28% of companies 
that employ 100 or more people.25 
The Chief of Naval Operations has defined recognition 
of the Navy as a top 50 employer in the United States as 
 
23 Anita U. Hattiangadi, Private Sector Benefit Offerings in the 
Competition for High skill Recruits, CNA Research Memorandum 
D0003563.A2 (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 2001), 8. 
24 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Military Personnel: Active 
Duty Benefits Reflect Changing Demographics, but Opportunities Exist to 
Improve. Report, GAO-02-935 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2002), 57. 
25 TED:  The Editor’s Desk, “Flexible Benefits and reimbursement 
accounts, April 4, 2007,” Bureau of Labor and Statistics. 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/apr/wk1/art03.txt (accessed October 
27, 2008). 
one of his goals for 2008.26  By examining the effort of 
leaders in Corporate America, the Navy can adapt and adopt 
their best practices to achieve this goal. 
A. CORPORATE NON-MONETARY INCENTIVE EFFORTS 
1. Total Rewards 
The Corporate Leadership Council (CLC) suggests 
implementing a Total Rewards philosophy with respect to 
compensation.  “A Total Rewards philosophy is a strategic 
means of merging the roles of the compensation and benefits 
function.  This approach focuses on the monetary and non-
monetary incentives used to attract, engage, and motivate 
human capital.”27 
 
Figure 7.   Components of a Total Rewards Philosophy (From 
Corporate Leadership Council, Total Rewards Philosophy 
Components and Statements)28 
                     
26 Gary Roughead, ADM, USN, “Keynote Address,” (Surface Navy 
Association Symposium, Arlington, Virginia, January 15, 2008). 
27 Corporate Leadership Council (CLC), “Total Rewards Philosophy 
Components and Statements,” Corporate Executive Board, 1. 
www.corporateleadershipcouncil.com (accessed October 24, 2008). 
26 
28 Corporate Leadership Council, “Total Rewards Philosophy Components 
and Statements,” 2. 
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They define a total rewards package as being comprised of 
all of the reasons why “a talented individual would want to 
work and remain at a company.”29  This philosophy must be 
clearly defined and shared with organizational employees.  
Employees must know that the purpose of Total Rewards is to 
“focus on serving the workforce, as well as organizations’ 
business objectives.”30  Additionally, employees must be 
educated as to the true value of their total compensation. 
This final point is especially relevant to the Navy.  
Hattiangadi notes that “[c]urrently, information about the 
various benefits offered to military personnel and their 
families is scattered among an array of websites and 
publications.  Most private-sector companies offer 
materials of this type, so such a move would facilitate 
comparison of offered private-sector and military 
compensation packages.”31 
2. Navy-Civilian Comparison Message  
The Navy attempts to achieve employee recognition of 
benefits by releasing an annual message that compares 
military earnings with their civilian equivalents.  While 
this is a worthwhile endeavor, it may not have the desired 
impact.  Most Sailors are unaware of the true value of the 
Navy’s compensation package.  By implementing a benefits 
system where Sailors choose to keep and reject various non-
 
29 Corporate Leadership Council, “Total Rewards Philosophy Components 
and Statements,” 2. 
30 Corporate Leadership Council, “Total Rewards Philosophy Components 
and Statements,” 3. 
31 Hattiangadi, Private Sector Benefit Offerings, 127. 
 28
                    
monetary benefits, they will be forced to examine and 
understand the value of their compensation packages. 
A recent Naval Message32 illustrates the significance 
of benefits in the overall military compensation package 
when compared to similar civilian occupations: 
A Petty Officer Second Class Aviation Mechanic 
[AM2] stationed in Norfolk with two dependents 
and over four years of service[’s] … military 
gross annual salary is approximately 46,487 
dollars as compared to a private sector 
counterpart at approximately 43,790 dollars.  
Breaking down the Petty Officer’s total annual 
salary, this Sailor is making about 3,533 dollars 
in BAS [Basic Allowance for Subsistence], 15,324 
dollars in BAH (w/dependents)[Basic Allowance for 
Housing with dependents], 680 dollars clothing 
maintenance, and base pay of 26,968 dollars.  
Unlike her private sector counterpart, the Petty 
Officer receives a tax break because allowances 
such as BAH and BAS are not subject to Federal 
Income Tax.  This tax advantage increases the 
value of the Petty Officer’s annual salary by 
5,721 dollars.  As a civilian, the Aviation 
Mechanic in this example would have to earn about 
52,000 dollars to have a comparable after-tax 
income.  This amount does not include annual 
indirect compensation attained such as medical, 
dental, vision and commissary benefits which add 
up to approximately 6,785 dollars.33   
This message also points out the defined-benefits 
retirement plan that is provided at no direct cost to the 
member: 
If this same Sailor makes an informed decision 
and decides to stay Navy and retire after 24 
years as a Senior Chief Petty Officer, she can 
 
32 Chief of Naval Operations, Pay and Compensation/Stay Navy 
Campaign, DTG 212124Z MAR 08 (Washington, D.C.: 2008).  
33 Chief of Naval Operations, Pay and Compensation/Stay Navy 
Campaign, DTG 212124Z MAR 08 (Washington, D.C.: 2008). 
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expect …. [under the] High-3 Military Retirement, 
payout over 40 years of over five million 
dollars.  As a civilian [she] would have to 
accrue 2,652,892 dollars at the time of 
retirement to receive a comparable payout.  In 
order to achieve this amount, [she] would have to 
invest 57,972 dollars annually at an eight 
percent return over a 20-year period.34 
3. Example: The Royal Bank of Scotland 
The Corporate Leadership Council (CLC) analyzed the 
Royal Bank of Scotland’s (RBS) efforts when introducing a 
flexible benefits plan to its employees.  RBS offered 
flexibility in existing medical and dental coverage, 
various levels of group rate additional insurance policies, 
childcare vouchers, discounted retail vouchers, and the 
opportunity to buy or sell vacation days among many other 
benefits.  They determined the mix of offerings based on 
employee focus groups, questionnaires, and manager 
interviews.  They defined the advantages of a flexible 
benefits program at RBS as shown in Figure 8. 
 
34 Chief of Naval Operations, Pay and Compensation/Stay Navy 
Campaign, DTG 212124Z MAR 08 (Washington, D.C.: 2008). 
 
Figure 8.   Advantages to RBS Flexible Benefits Plan (From 
Corporate Leadership Council, Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
Flexible Benefits Package)35 
CLC found that RBS met all of its objectives by 
introducing the plan.  RBS achieved significant employee 
participation, employee satisfaction, recognition as an 
employer of choice in the United Kingdom, and company 
satisfaction in terms of cost-effectiveness and the ability 
to offer benefits most desired by employees.36 
                     
35 Corporate Leadership Council (CLC), “Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
Flexible Benefits Package.” Corporate Executive Board. 
www.corporateleadershipcouncil.com (accessed July, 16, 2008). 
30
36 CLC, “Royal Bank of Scotland.” 
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4. Employee Satisfaction, Communication and 
Distributive Justice 
Another important question is how flexible benefit 
plans affect employee satisfaction.  More satisfied 
employees are more likely to stay at a company and require 
less monetary incentives.37  This reduces retention and 
turnover costs.  Tremblay, et al., attempted to determine 
what influences employee satisfaction and, more 
specifically, how flexible benefit plans influence employee 
satisfaction.  They linked these research objectives to the 
organizational goals to “to maintain satisfaction levels 
and at the same time control costs.”38  They further refined 
their research objectives by presenting nine hypotheses 
that they tested: 
1. The more importance individuals attach to 
benefits, the more satisfied they will be with 
those benefits 
2. There is a positive relationship between 
inter-organizational mobility and benefit 
satisfaction. 
3. There is a positive relationship between 
perception of security and satisfaction with 
benefits. 
4. There is a positive relationship between the 
perception of distributive justice and benefit 
satisfaction. 
5. The perceived importance of benefits plays a 
moderator role in the relationship between 
distributive justice and benefit satisfaction.  
 
37 Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics 
Theory and Public Policy, 10th ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley, 2008). 
38 Michel Tremblay, Bruno Sire, and Annie Pelchat. “A Study of the 
Determinants and of the Impact of Flexibility on Employee Benefits 
Satisfaction,” Human Relations 51, no. 5 (May 1998). 
http://www.proquest.com (accessed July 20, 2008), 667-688. 
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6. There is a positive relationship between the 
perception of involvement in decisions 
related to benefits and benefit 
satisfaction. 
7. There is a positive relationship between the 
perception that employee preferences are 
considered and benefit satisfaction.  
8. There is a positive relationship between 
communication received and benefit 
satisfaction. 
9. There is a positive relationship between 
flexibility of benefits and benefits 
satisfaction.39 
To test these hypotheses, the authors examined the 
effects of three distinctly different benefit plans:  a 
traditional Fixed-Benefits plan employed by an insurance 
company, a Modular Flexible plan (different benefit bundles 
to choose from) used by a University, and a Core-Plus plan 
(a core group of essential benefits plus other options that 
employees can add to the core) used by a drinks 
manufacturing company.  They surveyed employees in each 
firm to capture the employees’ perceptions of fairness, 
communication, security, and flexibility of benefits with 
respect to job satisfaction.  By comparing these three 
types of plans, they were able to examine the effects of 
each level of flexibility -- from none to maximum -- to 
test their hypotheses. 
They cite various studies that suggest introducing 
employee flexibility and choice will simultaneously 
increase employee satisfaction and control the rising costs 
of providing benefits -- especially health care. 
 
39 Tremblay et al., “Benefits Satisfaction.” 671-676. 
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The authors incorporate demographic controls in their 
model and, additionally, include variables designed to 
capture the concepts described in the hypotheses, such as 
benefit importance, perception of distributive justice, 
level of participation in the decision, and communication 
level of the organization.  They obtained these measures 
through the survey given to employees in the three firms. 
Their choice of three distinctly different firms was 
questionable.  They note that “some differences in 
respondent profiles emerged from the data.”40  They report a 
high response rate, 42.2%, but fail to mention how 
representative that response was except to state that it 
was not entirely in keeping with the individual firm 
profiles.  This leads the reader to question how applicable 
these findings are to the rest of the business community.  
They were highly successful in establishing an 
argument for further research into flexible benefits 
packages and their impact on employee satisfaction, cost 
reduction, and attraction of non-traditional employees.  Of 
the nine hypotheses, five were confirmed, one was refuted 
and three had inconclusive findings.  They found 
communication to be the most influential aspect of benefits 
satisfaction. This was followed by perception of 
distributive justice.   
This research reveals the tremendous potential of 
flexible benefits packages.  It also underscores the 
necessity to communicate the scope of the company’s 
benefits offerings and establish faith in the fairness of 
benefits allocation.  To make an informed decision between 
 
40 Tremblay et al., “Benefits Satisfaction.” 676. 
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employment opportunities, employees must be aware of the 
entirety of their compensation package. 
They also found some evidence to suggest that 
individuals value the ability to choose as highly as the 
actual choices themselves.41  But can people handle such a 
large volume of complex choices? 
B. CONFRONTING THE COMPLEXITY OF INCENTIVE CHOICES 
Van Boening et al., conducted “individual-choice 
decision-cost”42 experiments to investigate the idea that 
flexible benefit plans have the potential to increase job 
satisfaction and retention.  They posit that employees must 
perceive the new plan as more valuable and be willing and 
able to select the optimal combination of offerings.  To 
test their hypothesis, the authors conducted “an experiment 
on choices over stylized benefits packages where discrete 
goods have multiple attributes affecting the payoff 
function”43.  The hypothesis tested was that individuals 
would be able to make “payoff-maximizing decisions in the 
presence of multiple attributes …. In effect, solve a 
complex programming problem.”44  The authors further 
theorized that subjects would develop heuristics to cope 
with these complex situations.  This hypothesis was based 
on previous research aimed at determining whether “human 
 
41 Mark Van Boening, Tanja F. Blackstone, Michael MckKee, and 
Elisabet Rutstrom.  “Benefit Packages and Individual Behavior:  Choices 
Over Discrete Goods with Multiple Attributes,” Managerial and Decision 
Economics 27 (2006}, 511-526. 
42 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 511. 
43 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 511. 
44 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 512. 
 35
                    
decision making is intrinsically prone to errors [or] that 
it is fundamentally efficient.”45 
The experiments were conducted at the Mississippi 
research Laboratory at the University of Mississippi and 
the Business, Economics, Accounting, and Marketing 
Laboratory at the University of South Carolina. 
The subjects were 80 student volunteers from the 
respective Universities’ undergraduate business schools.  
No mention is made as to the demographic characteristics or 
selection method of the volunteers.  The statistical model 
used, however, for hypothesis testing used 79 individual 
dummy variables to cancel out individual biases that could 
be present. 
The simulation consisted of a game designed to mimic 
the choices required to maximize payoff and satisfaction 
from a flexible benefits package.  The objective of the 
game was to choose the optimal combination of cells to 
achieve a payoff higher than the fixed payoff option.  
The payoff from the game was the reward from selecting 
a certain number of cells.  The subjects were aware at all 
times of the fixed payoff amount from declining to play the 
game (no effort); the maximum payoff from playing the game; 
and individual values relating to the choices and their 
weights on the final payoff.  The subjects also knew the 
time remaining and the payoff they had achieved as a result 
of their choices.  They could select and deselect as many 
cells as they wished in the four-minute time limit.  They 
were given a maximum cell value sum with which to achieve 
 
45 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 512. 
 36
                    
the optimal payoff from playing the game and were aware of 
the current cell value sum at all times.  They could also 
choose the fixed payoff option at any time during the four-
minute round.  This design approximates the choices and 
constraints an individual might face when choosing his 
options under a flexible benefits plan. 
The experiment consisted of a “2x2 design with 
[individual] cell payoff and fixed payoff option as the 
treatment variables.”46  The treatment variables were chosen 
to ensure the “variety of choices within a given matrix and 
the variety of optimal solutions across matrices [was] 
sufficiently rich for data analysis.”47  Other variables 
were kept constant to keep the “computational difficulty 
facing the subject … significant, but not overwhelming.”48   
In each round, the subjects were given the option of 
“playing a ‘cell selection’ game or accepting a known fixed 
payoff in lieu of playing the game.”   
Only 4% overall chose to take the fixed payoff.  The 
low percentage of people selecting fixed payoff “suggests 
that typical subject’s decision cost [of playing the game] 
is substantially less than 20[%] of the maximum payoff.”49  
It also suggests that “the typical subject places a high 
implicit valuation on the flexibility in making choices as 
she is apparently confident in her ability to exceed the 
fixed payoff.”50 
 
46 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 512. 
47 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 515. 
48 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 515. 
49 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 518. 
50 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 523. 
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In 84% of rounds, subjects earned at least 90% of 
maximum payoff.  When the cell payoff was low -- 20 versus 
100 points per cell -- the majority of subjects earned in 
the 97-100% range.  “A relatively low cell payoff implies 
that cell value is more important in determining reward.”51  
Therefore, for those that place relatively low value on the 
number of benefits they receive, the individual value of 
those benefits is extremely important. 
There was weak evidence that the higher the fixed 
payoff alternative, the more the subject earns.  This has 
an interesting implication.  The rules of the experiment 
were analogous to allowing employees to have the option of 
keeping their fixed benefits plan while shopping for the 
flexible plan.  The authors suggest that the higher the 
perceived value of the traditional plan, the more likely it 
is that the optimal flexible plan will be discovered by the 
employee. 
The authors identify three simple heuristics that the 
subjects developed: 
1.  “H:” Subjects focus on high cell values (700-
1000); low number(<3) of cells selected; and 
decision cost: LOW / Payoff: LOW. 
2.  “M:” Subjects focus on medium cell values (350-
750); 4-5 selected per round; and decision 
Cost/Payoff: between H and L. 
 
51 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 520. 
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3.  “L:” Subjects focus on low cell values (100-
350); >6 cells selected per round; and decision 
Cost: HIGH /Payoff: HIGH.52 
At least 60% of subjects appeared to have used the L 
heuristic (high payoff with high decision cost) in each 
session; 50% fit into the category overall (meaning they 
used it every time); and less than 10% used the H heuristic 
(low decision cost/low payoff) in each session (only 5% 
used it every time).53 
This suggests that the majority of the people find the 
potential gain outweighs the mental effort required to 
complete the task. 
In Modern Labor Economics, the authors note that 
“employers will tailor their compensation packages to suit 
the preferences of the workers they are trying to 
attract.”54  Van Boening, et al.’s model allows the employer 
to offer a menu of choices and the employees to choose 
which options suit them.  This theory goes on to suggest 
that the mere presence of a choice is itself a benefit and 
that a “flexible benefits package may be strongly preferred 
to a pre-defined benefits package.”55 
The model does not suggest what these benefits should 
be.  Rather, it is up to the employer to tailor offerings 
to suit target employees.  The literature suggests the 
benefits’ respective values will differ between 
 
52 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 521. 
53 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 522. 
54 Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics 
Theory and Public Policy, 10th ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley, 2008), 
269.  
55 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 523. 
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individuals.  This seems to be a reasonable assumption and 
the model allows for this by varying the treatment 
variables and providing choices between the cell values in 
a substantial range. 
Because most subjects chose to play the game and 
exceeded the fixed payoff value, the results demonstrate 
that a flexible benefits package will increase employee job 
satisfaction.  This will aid employers in retention and 
possibly attract a larger applicant pool from which to 
draw.  The Navy could benefit from such a plan.  This is 
based on the following conclusions from this study: 
1. People value having choice almost as much as 
the choices themselves.56 
2. People achieve a higher payoff when the 
fixed payoff is relatively high, but less 
valuable than the flexible plan’s payoff. 
This suggests that employers should offer a 
fixed plan with comparable, but less 
valuable offerings, in addition to the 
flexible plan.57 
3. Most people are willing to exert the mental 
effort to exceed the no-effort reward -- even if 
the easy (fixed) payoff is 80% of the possible 
complex-effort payoff. 
4. People can easily handle this complex decision 
making task.  The subjects, however, were college 
students.  To determine applicability to the Navy 
 
56 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 523. 
57 Van Boening et al., “Benefit Packages,” 523. 
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enlisted community and to determine if there are 
significant differences, a similar experiment 
should be run on high-school graduates, non-high- 
school graduates, and alternative degree holders. 
C. IDENTIFYING THE BEST NON-MONETARY INCENTIVE OFFERINGS 
The Denmond et al., thesis was the starting point for 
determining which incentives to include in the Enlisted 
Retention Survey and the subsequent simulated retention 
auctions. Their results showed the top non-monetary 
compensation attracters for Surface Warfare Officers to be:  
increased graduate education opportunities, guaranteed base 
housing, geographic stability, leave sabbatical, 
telecommuting, and additional money for dependents 
(education and daycare).  These incentives were adjusted to 
reflect enlisted Sailor attributes, such as tour length and 
educational achievement, and served as the template for the 
survey used in this research.  Similarly, the original 
Surface Warfare Officer Retention Survey was modified and 
expanded to suit the Enlisted Community’s distinct needs.   
Several previous Navy retention and benefits studies 
were analyzed and additional incentives, such as shipboard 
berthing options, lump-sum SRB payments, transferability of 
GI Bill benefits, and professional certification program 
were added to the survey and model. 
 
1.  Results of Previous Conjoint Analysis 
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted a 
Choice-Based Conjoint survey to determine “[w]hich [Quality 
of Service (QOS)] factors are most important to the fleet’s 
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Sailors and how do these QOS factors compare with pay in 
terms of their power to keep people satisfied and in the 
Navy?”58  They specifically wanted to determine: 
1. What are Sailors’ preferences? 
2. What is the strength of those preferences? 
3. What tradeoffs do sailors make between pay and 
non-pay factors when making reenlistment 
decisions? 
“In analysis of the [survey] data, the relevant 
constraint is the Navy budget.  Specifically, the Navy is 
looking for information that will help to identify the most 
valued and potentially most cost-effective QOS programs 
among a variety of possibilities.”59 
This study did not measure the absolute value of 
present and potential compensation components.  Rather, it 
measured the relative value of these components as compared 
to the increases in pay required to achieve comparable 
results. 
“The survey results indicate that, even with several 
measures of pay included in the survey, non-pay factors 
play a substantial, measurable role in guiding Sailors’ 
reenlistment intentions.  More specifically, the two 
highest impact QOS improvements are location and duty-type 
assignment guarantees.  These non-pay factors had pay-
equivalent values of 5.7 and 4.3[%], respectively, 
 
58 Amanda B. N. Kraus, Diana S. Lien, and Bryan K. Orme, The Navy 
Survey on Reenlistment and Quality of Service: Using Choice-Based 
Conjoint To Quantify Relative Preferences for Pay and Nonpay Aspects of 
Naval Service, CNA Research Memorandum D0008416.A2 (Alexandria, 
Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 2003), 11. 
59 Kraus et al., Choice-Based Conjoint Survey, 13. 
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indicating that Sailors value these guarantees as much as 
pay increases in the range of 4 to 6[%].”60 
Other non-monetary incentives that had a significant 
positive value when compared to monetary offerings were 
guaranteed time for voluntary education and increased 
shipboard living space.  Requiring Sailors to live onboard 
a ship while in port had the largest overall effect -- 
significantly negative.  If this requirement were 
reinstituted, the study found that a 12.5% increase in 
basic pay would be required to maintain current 
reenlistment rates.61  The CNA study did not include many of 
the benefits included in this thesis’s survey, such as 
leave sabbatical, telecommuting, compressed workweek, and 
transferability of GI Bill benefits. 
2. The “Mix” 
Military Compensation Reform in the Department of the 
Navy62 summarizes the Department of the Navy’s Human Capital 
Strategy and Guiding Principles as issued by the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, Manpower, and Reserve Affairs (ASN 
(M&RA)). 
The seven strategic “objectives for creating a well 
performing, efficient, balanced, and effective human 




60 Kraus et al., Choice-Based Conjoint Survey, 3. 
61 Kraus et al., Choice-Based Conjoint Survey, 62. 
62 Michael L. Hansen and Martha E. Koopman, Military Compensation 
Reform in the Department of the Navy, CNA Research Memorandum 
D00012889.A2 (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 2005).   
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compensate, (4) recruit and access, (5) manage, (6) shape 
the force, and (7) separate or retire ….through [seven] 
goals:”63  
 Recruit the proper number of high quality 
people with the skills required for the terms 
of service needed. 
 Retain the proper number of high-performing 
personnel with the right skills and experience 
for the terms of service needed. 
 Inspire Attainment of the Highest Standards of 
Performance (Attain High Performance), 
including motivating high levels of individual 
and collective performance, productivity, and 
contributions needed for the naval Services to 
successfully accomplish their missions. 
 Reward Exceptional Performance through 
appropriate means, both monetary and 
nonmonetary. 
 Assign the best people, with the required 
skills and experience, to perform the needed 
work, where and when needed 
 Motivate Professional Development (Motivate 
Development) that fosters a culture of 
professional interest and growth so that 
people willingly acquire and use the skills, 
knowledge, and abilities required for specific 
jobs. 
 Facilitate Career Transitions (Facilitate 
Transitions) at appropriate times between 
active, reserve, civilian, retired, and 
volunteer status in response to workforce 
requirements.  The compensation system should 
allow and encourage people to pursue rewarding 
work/life opportunities throughout their 
careers.64 
 
63 Hansen and Koopman, Military Compensation Reform, 8-10. 
64 Hansen and Koopman, Military Compensation Reform, 8-10. 
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The Guiding Principles that help decision-makers 
support these objectives are to ensure that programs and 
policies are: 
 All Volunteer: The Department’s compensation 
policies support an all-volunteer workforce; 
members perceive their compensation as ‘fair 
and equitable’. 
 Flexible, Responsive (Flexible): The 
Department must be able to quickly and 
effectively change compensation policies to 
respond to changing market conditions and 
Service requirements …. 
 Strategic Best Value (Best Value): The 
Department’s compensation policies must be 
aligned with other elements of their larger 
human capital strategy to produce the 
highest value, maximizing contribution, and 
minimizing cost …. 
 Support Achievement of Strategic Objectives 
and Outcomes (Support Objectives): Rational 
Compensation Policies support a hierarchy of 
strategic objectives and outcomes for 
successfully competing for talent and 
rewarding performance and recognizing 
contribution to mission.65   
The study evaluates the Navy’s current major 
compensation tools and how well they follow the four 
principles and satisfy the seven objectives.  Hansen and 
Koopman demonstrate that there is not a single compensation 
tool available to the Navy at this time that satisfies all 
objectives.  Most of the compensation tools do not fulfill 
half of the goals and adhere weakly -- if at all -- to the 
guiding principles.  Figure 9 shows the scorecard for 
Retirement Pay, which is the worst-performing compensation 
 
65 Hansen and Koopman, Military Compensation Reform, 10. 
tool.  Figure 10 shows the scorecard for Basic Pay, which 
is, not surprisingly, the best-performing tool.  
Retirement Pay
Goals Principles
Recruit No: overall a large portion of 
pay, but too heavily 
discounted for new recruits.
All Volunteer Yes.
Retain Incorrectly: drives across-
the-board retention and 
transition patterns for YOS1-
30 years
Flexible No: doesn’t support variable 
career lengths, innovative 
career paths, exit and entry.
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Incorrectly: drives across-
the-board retention and 









No: can’t target force 
management element by 








Figure 9.   Retirement Incentive Scorecard (After Military 
Compensation Reform)66 
After analyzing the current tools available to the 
Navy, they suggest a flexible (or cafeteria) plan:  “if the 
employer can provide in-kind benefits in a way that allows 
people to retain some decision-making authority over their 
consumption choices, the value of the in-kind benefits will 
be higher.  This is the motivation behind cafeteria or 
Flexible benefit plans, which are becoming more prevalent 
with private-sector employers.”67 
                     
66 Hansen and Koopman, Military Compensation Reform, App. C. 
67 Hansen and Koopman, Military Compensation Reform, 79. 
Basic Pay
Goals Principles
Yes.Recruit Yes. All Volunteer
Yes: especially at first 
reenlistment.
Retain
Weakly: by flattening out at 
higher YOS.
Flexible No: Congress can adjust 

















Best ValueSomewhat: depends on the 
increase in basic pay 
associated with promotion 
and length of service.
 
Figure 10.   Basic Pay Scorecard (After Military Compensation 
Reform)68 
They further suggest that “[o]nce an optimal mix of 
cash and in-kind benefits is determined … as much choice as 
possible should be offered among different benefits (e.g., 
cafeteria plans).  In this way, the DON’s benefit package 
will best align its guiding principles of being Flexible 
and Best Value while Supporting the Objectives often met 
through noncash compensation.”69 
Their final recommendation includes a quality-based 
compensation plan, which will not be addressed in this 
research.  The focus of the Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism (CRAM) is cost-effectiveness while maintaining 
current quality.  The current system of evaluations and 
retention recommendations is sufficient to maintain  
 
                     
68 Hansen and Koopman, Military Compensation Reform, App. C. 
69 Hansen and Koopman, Military Compensation Reform, 72. 
acceptable levels of quality.  Providing a compensation 
system tailored to individual needs and desires will retain 
those most willing to serve.  
Based on the criterion set forth by Hansen and 
Koopman, the CRAM model proposed in this paper could have a 
scorecard similar to Figure 11.   
Combinatorial retention Auction Mechanism
Goals Principles
Yes.Recruit Yes:  individuals who place a 
high value on non-monetary 
compensation will be most 
interested in the Navy 
All 
Volunteer
Yes: Memebers would choose 
the benefits they desire most.  
Would require flexible 
budgeting of SRB allocation.
Yes:  individuals who place a 
high value on non-monetary 
compensation will be most 
interested in the Navy
Retain
Possible: if sabbatical, on/off 





Somewhat:  individuals who 
obtain critical/technical skills 









Best ValueSomewhat:  individuals who 
obtain critical/technical skills 
will be highly rewarded. Must 
be retention eligible.  However, 
higher rank often coincides 
with lower SRB.
Yes.  By substituting cash 
payments for non-monetary 
benefits and allocating those 
Incentives only to those who 






Figure 11.   Projected CRAM Scorecard (After Military 
Compensation Reform)70 
The CRAM Model will address the strategic goals of 
Recruit and Retain by showcasing the abundance and variety 
of benefits available to service members.  It will be a 
highly Flexible and responsive tool that will adjust easily 
and readily to changing labor supply and demand conditions.  
It will provide strategic Best Value to the Navy by 
                     
70 Hansen and Koopman, Military Compensation Reform, App. C. 
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ensuring considerable Sailor value while also being more 
cost effective than the current compensation policies. 
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IV. ENLISTED RETENTION SURVEY 
To test the hypothesis -- offering non-monetary 
incentives in a total rewards, flexible benefits package 
would be the most efficient method of achieving the Navy’s 
retention objectives -- it was necessary to determine the 
value Enlisted Sailors placed on those incentives.  To 
determine these values, a survey was designed and 
administered to approximately 6,000 Sailors throughout the 
fleet. 
One of the biggest challenges in statistical analysis 
is determining the sample.  To mitigate variables such as 
first term obligation length, training intensity and 
length, minimum recruiting criterion, civilian 
opportunities, and SRB levels, the researchers chose to 
concentrate on two Navy enlisted ratings rather than the 
entire enlisted population. 
A. TARGET POPULATION AND METHODS OF CONTACT  
The Air Traffic Controller (AC) and Fire Controlman 
AEGIS (FC AEGIS) ratings were selected by the research 
sponsor based on each community’s size and retention 
challenges.  The Department of the Navy indentified these 
ratings as two of the twenty “most undermanned critical 
skills.”71 
 
71 U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2009 Budget Estimates Submission: Justification of Estimates, 
February 2008, Military Personnel, Navy (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008), 85. 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/09PRES/MPN_Book.pdf (accessed: 
November 6, 2008). 
 50
Unfortunately, Naval Personnel Command (NPC) was only 
able to provide approximately 50% of the email addresses 
for personnel with those ratings.  To ensure maximum 
contact, approximately 150 Command Master Chiefs were sent 
emails requesting they forward the survey invitation 
(below) to their respective Petty Officers First Class (E-
6) and below ACs and FCs (AEGIS and non-AEGIS): 
Subj: Survey Invitation from the Naval 
Postgraduate School 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE: 
You are cordially invited to participate in the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Non-Monetary 
Retention Incentives Survey. This survey will 
allow you to give us important feedback regarding 
non-monetary benefits such as geographic 
stability, telecommuting, compressed workweek or 
guaranteed homeport as well as an opportunity for 
you to give “write-in” suggestions. The survey’s 
main focus is to assess how much you would value 
the included non-monetary benefits if they were 
offered as a part of your reenlistment package.  
If you receive this invitation from more than one 
source, we apologize. We are sending these 
invitations through multiple avenues to ensure 
everyone gets a voice! Please only take the 
survey once.  Thank you in advance for your 
participation! 
Survey closes 11 Jul 08. Please click on link: 
http://www.surveymk.com/s.aspx?sm=m3GQ9plp63OmH52
DN8N0Bg_3d_3d 
The survey was available via www.surveymonkey.com from 
June 24, 2008, until July 11, 2008.  The entire survey is 
included in Appendix A.  It is no longer available online. 
To ensure complete coverage, potential subjects were 
also contacted via available individual email addresses. 
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B.   RATING INFORMATION 
The following sections will give a brief overview of 
the two ratings and demographic information for each 
rating’s population and sample. 
Naval Personnel Command provided the following 
information about the AC and FC ratings: 
1. Air Traffic Controller 
Navy Air Traffic Controllers (AC) perform 
duties similar to civilian air traffic 
controllers and play a key role in the effective 
use of Naval airpower throughout the world in 
operational and training environments.  Navy ACs 
are responsible for safely and effectively 
directing aircraft operating from airfields or 
the decks of aircraft carriers.  They also 
control the movement of aircraft and vehicles on 
airfield taxiways and issue flight instructions 
to pilots by radio.  Standards for entry into the 
AC field are high, but once accepted into the 
field, Navy ACs enjoy a demanding and highly 
rewarding career.  This is a five-year enlistment 
program.72 
2. Fire Controlman 
Only two Navy job specialties, called 
"ratings," are included in the Advanced 
Electronics / Computer Field: Electronics 
Technician (ET) and Fire Controlman (FC).  The 
rating in which an Advanced Electronics / 
Computer Field candidate is trained is determined 
in the initial phase of the Advanced Electronics 
Technical Core Course in Great Lakes, Ill.  
However, eligibility requirements are the same 
for both ratings in the Advanced Electronics / 
Computer Field. 
 
72 Michael J. Otten, PERS 4011, email message to the author, November 
18, 2008. 
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Jobs performed by … FCs are performed throughout 
the Navy's fleet of surface ships including 
aircraft carriers and Aegis cruisers, and at 
repair activities ashore….  
    FCs operate, maintain and repair the Fire 
Control Radars, mainframe computers, large screen 
displays, LANS, weapon control consoles, 
automatic gun systems and associated electro-
mechanical systems utilized in weapons systems. 
    These ratings comprise the basis of the 
ship's Combat Systems department aboard ships and 
are responsible for maintaining the ship's 
readiness for combat operations.73 
While the AC and FC ratings are vastly different in 
terms of duties and responsibilities, they are comparable 
with respect to initial obligation length, intensity of 
training, and quantity of civilian employment 
opportunities. 
C. POPULATION STATISTICS 
There were 2,306 ACs at the time of the survey, 20.4% 
of which were female. There were 2,115 E-6 and below and 
29.7% of the rating’s billets were at sea.  Of the 2038 FC 
AEGIS personnel, only 6.4% were female.  There were 1,733 
E-6 and below and 76.7% of the rating’s billets were at 
sea.  There were 4,032 Non-AEGIS FCs in the fleet of which 
8.9% were female and 62.7% of these billets were at sea.74  
The AC and FC ratings provide an excellent contrast to each 
other in terms of the above demographic characteristics. 
 
73 Earl Salter, BUPERS-322C, email message to the author, November, 6 
2008. 
74 Edward Ferber, ETCM(SW/AW), email message to the author, July, 28 
2008. 
Due to the relatively small size and 15% expected 
response rate, the researchers chose to distribute the 
survey to the entire population (including non-AEGIS FCs). 
Because of the second-hand nature of contacting the 
Sailors, a response rate was difficult to determine.  
Dependent on the number of sailors actually contacted, 
response estimates ranged from 8.6% to 11.5%. 
Although the response rate was relatively low75, there 
was a fairly representative sample.  Table 1 shows a 
comparison of the population versus the sample in key 
demographics.  Hispanics were considerably over-represented 
in the FC (AEGIS) rating.  Air Traffic Controller was 
under-represented at sea and Fire Controlman was over-
represented.  
 
Table 1.   Population and Sample Statistics 
  AC FC(non-AEGIS) FC(AEGIS) 
  Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
Female 20.81% 21.62% 8.93% 11.76% 7.50% 11.80%
Black 23.59% 22.27% 10.97% 8.11% 11.45% 12.57%
Hispanic 15.62% 9.55% 1.36% 5.95% 10.62% 10.18%
Under 27 59.66% 57.14% 48.45% 58.82% 46.13% 54.80%
28-42 37.96% 42.38% 47.73% 39.57% 49.83% 42.94%
Over 42 2.38% 0.48% 4.27% 1.60% 4.34% 2.26%
E6 & below 92.11% 97.76% 82.49% 96.79% 85.39% 95.51%
E-5 37.20% 41.70% 34.76% 54.55% 40.43% 51.12%
E-4 & below 30.35% 19.28% 24.39% 17.11% 14.52% 11.80%
At sea 29.29% 19.00% 62.72% 98.26% 72.54% 90.51%
  
 
1. FC(NON-AEGIS) significantly under-represented (Hispanic) 
2. Due to targeting of E-6 and below, under-representation expected 
3. AC under-represented and FC over-represented (at sea) 
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75 Kraus et al., Choice-Based Conjoint Survey, 31. 
 
 54
                    
In the sample, the extremely low percentage of age 42 
and above reflects the specific targeting of E-6 and below 
Sailors. 
D. RESULTS 
1. Distribution of Non-Monetary Incentive Values 
There were 688 completed surveys.  Only 604, however, 
were usable.  The deleted observations were missing crucial 
data (i.e., reservation values).  It was not possible to 
infer this data from the other available information.  
Derived numbers were contained in 17 observations.76 
Table 2 lists the average reservation values for a 
purely monetary reenlistment bonus and the dollar amount of 
that bonus the respondents would be willing to give up in 
exchange for a particular incentive.  The values in column 
1 include outliers (initial values in excess of $500,00077) 
and currently infeasible amounts (in excess of $150,00078).  
Column 2 excludes outliers and Column 3 excludes infeasible 
 
76 Of these individuals, 15 indicated that they would reenlist for 
free (no SRB).  They proceeded, however, to indicate a willingness to 
pay (WTP) a percentage of their SRB for the non-monetary incentives 
listed.  We inferred that they were aware of their eligibility for an 
SRB and were basing their WTP percentages on this amount.  SRB amounts, 
for calculation of WTP only, were derived from demographic information 
provided.  The Navy’s online SRB calculator 
(https://staynavytools.bol.navy.mil/SRB/Default.aspx) was used. SRB 
amounts for these individuals were entered as zero.  The remaining 2 
individuals indicated that they would require the “current SRB” to 
reenlist.  Their SRB amounts were derived using the above link. 
77 Values above $500,000 seemed to indicate that no amount of money 
would entice the respondent to reenlist.  There were only three 
responses in this category: $500,000, $1,000,000, and $10,000,000.  
These observations significantly skew the summary statistics and are 
considered true outliers. 
78 Although current maximum SRB amount can not exceed $90,000 
(OPNAVINST 1160.8A), the researchers chose $150,000 as a maximum 
feasibility level to ensure future viability of this analysis. 
requirements.  All usable responses, except one,79 were 
included in the thesis simulations. 
 
Table 2.   Average Reservation Values for Respondents 
 
 
With the exception of one value entry, all Willingness 
to Pay (WTP) values were less than the stated SRB 
requirements.  This indicates some consistency in 
reporting.  Combined incentive values were less consistent.  
The value of two or more incentives in combination 
sometimes exceeded the sum of the individual values.  This 
indicates complementarities between or among the combined 
incentives.  Often, the value of two or more incentives in 
combination exceeded the highest individual value, but did 
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79 Respondent 623144606’s responses were deleted.  The Sailor’s SRB 
requirement ($10,000,000) and two NMI values ($5,000,000 each) 
significantly skewed results. 
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not equal the sum of the individual incentives.  This 
indicates a possible diminishing marginal value to each 
additional non-monetary incentive or a substitution effect 
between or among the incentives within the combination.  
In approximately 30% of the responses, the reported 
value of two or more incentives in combination was below 
the value of the most highly valued individual incentive in 
that combination.  While unusual, there are many reasons 
why such reported combination values may have occurred.  
There may have been a significant negative interaction 
among the incentives included in the combination.  For 
example, a Sailor might have been interested in 
telecommuting or a compressed workweek separately, but 
perhaps his particular situation made telecommuting within 
a compressed work schedule particularly unappealing.  More 
simply, perhaps the respondent just forgot how he had 
valued the incentives in previous questions or the 
respondent grew tired and rushed through those final 
questions.  Chapter VI discusses how such unusual responses 
were addressed. 
Using the mean to determine central tendencies can be 
misleading in non-normal distributions.  Many of the value 
distributions for the non-monetary incentives have large 
clusters at zero dollars, smaller clusters at certain 
“focal” values, and long right-hand tails with few high 
values.  This is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.   Value Distribution for Telecommuting 
Because of this asymmetric distribution of values, 
simply reporting means and standard deviations does a poor 
job of describing the distribution of values associated 
with any particular non-monetary incentive. Consequently, 
Table 3 displays the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
percentile values to more accurately describe the value 
distribution for each incentive.  It is additionally 
advantageous to describe the distributions of values this 
way because the simulations, which this thesis will 
describe later, used different percentiles of the value 
distributions to estimate costs. 
Although there is no validated costing data, many of 
these incentives could reasonably be available at a cost 
below the 75th percentile of the value distributions. 
Appendix B contains value distribution figures for all 
Non-Monetary Incentives considered in the survey. 
57 
Table 3.   Reservation Value Percentiles 
 
 
One immediate and striking characteristic, which is 
revealed in Table 3, is that both the 10th and 25th 
percentiles of the distribution of reported values for 
every non-monetary incentive is zero.  This means that for 
each non-monetary incentive at least 25% of all respondents 
saw no value in that particular incentive.  For each non-
monetary incentive, at least 33% of the respondents 
reported a zero value and, as also seen in Table 3, a full 
majority of respondents reported a zero value for eight of 
the thirteen non-monetary incentives.  Further, more than 
75% reported a zero value for two of the incentives (BAH on 
sea duty and lump sum SRB). 
 
It is also relevant to note that there were 54 
reported NMI values that were not usable. This is because 
it was not possible to infer values based on the 
respondents’ answers.  For example, “this would never 
happen” may imply that the respondent values the option, 
but doesn’t believe it is feasible.  Some respondents put 
actual choices, such as “San Diego” for the homeport 
option, but failed to indicate a dollar amount.  Again, 
this implies some value but not a specific amount.  These 
values were assumed to be zero to include the respondent’s 
other choices.  There may be, however, some minor bias 
introduced into the model due to these discrepancies. 
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Note, however, that any bias introduced by assigning a 
zero value to these answers works in favor of the strictly 
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monetary retention incentives.  Further, it works against 
the two non-monetary incentive options examined in this 
study (the universal incentive package and the 
combinatorial retention auction mechanism).  Thus, the cost 
savings calculated in this study actually understates the 
true cost savings that could be achieved by effectively 
incorporating non-monetary incentives into the Navy’s 
retention offers.  Nonetheless, the ultimate impact of 
assuming zero value for these answers is likely minor as 
these 54 values account for less than .4% of the 13,869 
reported NMI values.  These 54 responses came from 26 
different respondents or 3.8% of the sample. 
2. Reasons for Accepting or Rejecting the SRB 
Respondents were asked the following open-
response question: 
Question 3:  What was/will be your primary reason 
for accepting/declining the Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), if offered? 
A. Reason for Accepting _______________. 
B. Reason for Declining _______________. 
The responses ranged from insightful, well articulated 
ideas to frustration over policies and perceptions.  Most 
respondents did not include a dollar figure as part of 
their answer.  There were, however, categories of responses 
that warrant further discussion. 
a. Reasons for Accepting the SRB 
Figure 13 summarizes the distribution of the most 
common categories of reasons for accepting the SRB. 
 
Figure 13.   Reasons for Accepting the SRB 
“The Money” 
Almost half (47%) of those who answered indicated 
that “money,” or the size of the bonus, was their primary 
reason for accepting the SRB.  The tone, however, of these 
responses suggests that there may have been other factors 
that influenced this decision, but the question wording was 
unclear.  For example, respondent 623952540 states, “I 
don't know why I wouldn't accept it. It's one of the 
reasons I would be reenlisting.”  Many also included a non-
monetary reason, such as respondent 622991201 who noted, 
“It was for 75,000 and I enjoy what I do,” or respondent 
621771622 who wrote, ”The amount of money, but would also 
like geographic location.” 
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Other Cash-related Reasons 
Almost 33% of the responses fell into the 
following categories:  to pay a specific/debt or bills 
(9.9%); to save for the future/retirement (12.8%); to 
compensate for equivalent civilian pay (3.2%); to 
compensate for type of work performed (2.8%); and specific 
family needs (4.1%).  While these reasons indicate the 
expected use of the bonus, many could feasibly be satisfied 
with non-monetary compensation. 
For example, respondent 621185813 states, “[P]ay 
off bills quickly and maintaining health insurance and life 
insurance from the government.”  This indicates that the 
respondent intended to use the SRB to pay off bills in a 
timely manner but may have reenlisted for the medical and 
life insurance benefits. 
“I love the Navy” 
Just over 6% said they were planning to reenlist 
anyway and that the bonus was an added benefit.  This 
indicates significant economic rent or surplus is being 
paid to these individuals as 57% of them are FCs who 
currently receive substantial SRBs.  For example, 
respondent 622007241 “[W]as going to stay in anyway. Bonus 
was an extra incentive.”  Some did, however, indicate they 
believed the SRB kept them on par with their civilian 
counterparts.  Respondent 623273057 stated, “I already love 
my job and this is incentive for me not to go to the 
civilian sector and make more money.” 
Other Reasons 
Almost 13% of respondents indicated that their 
reasons for reenlisting were non-monetary.  These covered a 
wide variety of reasons including medical, dental and 
retirement benefits, job stability, liking the Navy, 
enjoying one’s job, duty location guarantee, shore duty, 
advancement opportunities, pride in service, and one 
individual indicated he was reenlisting for the opportunity 
to go to sea! 
b. Reasons for Declining the SRB 
Figure 14 summarizes the distribution of the most 
common categories of reasons for declining the SRB. 
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Figure 14.   Reasons for Declining the SRB 
Civilian Opportunities 
The most popular reason for declining the bonus 
was better opportunities or pay in the civilian sector.  Of 
those who answered this way, 59% were FCs.  This suggests 
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that there is still a perceived pay-gap beyond that which 
the SRB attempts to compensate. 
“The Money” 
Only 21% of those who answered the question 
indicated that they would not accept the SRB because the 
amount was too low.  Combining this group with those who 
referenced better civilian opportunities or pay, as 
described in “Civilian Opportunities,” leaves 57% whose 
reported reasons for not reenlisting were not directly 
pecuniary.  Therefore, these might be addressed via non-
monetary incentives. 
 “I don’t like this place” 
Just over 18% of respondents indicated they were 
unhappy with aspects of their jobs or Navy life.  
Respondent 621725008 states, “I do not enjoy military life.  
Most of my time is not actually spent working with 
electronics.  I am a highly trained individual who spends 
most of his time cleaning instead of troubleshooting the 
weapon system.”  This same individual indicated that he 
would accept the SRB because it “was a good amount of 
money, the Navy has been good for me and my family.”  These 
responses indicate that, for this individual, money is not 
the primary driver for retention. 
“I’m getting out” 
Almost 14% of respondents gave no specific 
reason, but indicated that they would not be reenlisting.  
It is unclear from the results if some of these individuals 
were unwilling or unable to reenlist because they simply 
answered “I will not be reenlisting” or words to that 
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effect.  Of those who meant they were unwilling due to some 
non-pecuniary compensation issues, perhaps these 
individuals could be retained through non-monetary 
incentives. 
“What ifs” 
Only 7% of respondents gave hypothetical 
situations in which they would not reenlist.  For example, 
respondent 622066295 stated, “If at the time of re-
enlistment, it is not worth staying in, in regards to 
family and personal time.”  Respondent 622046321 stated, 
“If I am selected for an enlisted to officer program.”  
Others indicated if the amount was not enough, they would 
not reenlist, but did not specify that the current amount 
was too low. For example, “If I can't choose my orders and 
the sum is lower than I expected” (respondent 623904752). 
OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO 
Dissatisfaction with sea/shore rotation, 
deployment schedules, and time away from family were 
primary reasons for 14% of respondents to decline the SRB.  
Almost 8% specifically stated time away from family as the 
primary reason.  While high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and 
subsequent family separation are necessities in the Navy, 
there may be an opportunity to retain these sailors if they 
believe they are not excessive.  Respondent 623140885’s 
statement reflects a common sentiment, “Due to cutbacks, 
ships are undermanned and that means even longer hours in 
port and less time with family.” 
3. Respondent Retention Suggestions 
Respondents were also asked to list any other non-
monetary incentive(s) that the Navy could offer which would 
be attractive and the amount of bonus dollars that they 
would be willing to give up to receive that incentive. 
Figure 15 summarizes the distribution of the most 
common response categories. 
 
Figure 15.   Open Comments 
Over half of the responses fit into one of six basic 
categories.  The remaining 44% proposed changes to the 
promotion system, structuring of billets, retirement 
policy, education opportunities, and current leadership.  
For example, respondent 621267862 stated,  
Return the training commands to the military, who 
possess a clue about what is necessary to train 
Sailors rather than civilians who have no concept 
of shipboard life.  Working knowledge of the gear 
is far more valuable than theory and experience 
on an actual platform surpasses a civilian’s dry-
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side knowledge.  Open the billets for training 
back up for the sailors who know the gear and how 
it really acts. $45,000 (all). 
Respondent 621303137 stated, “Retire at 10 years 
service-$60,000. Automatic advancement-$40,000.” 
Respondent 621318214 suggested, “TAD orders set aside 
for college and/or work toward college (9 mo/s - 1 year) -  
$45000.”  This is an interesting twist to the sabbatical 
idea and is similar to the former Enlisted Education 
Advancement Program. 
Respondent 621566154 gave multiple suggestions and 
feedback on our survey options and also expressed 
frustration with the current SRB policy: 
I believe you need to seriously modify the 
current plan installed now for SRB. There are 
Sailors at my command that have been in for 4 
years, do not have their Enlisted Surface Warfare 
Specialist Pin, do not have collateral duties, 
and are getting ready to reenlist for $75,000 
(tax free). Where is the logic in that? You are 
rewarding those who do nothing for you. I believe 
there should be a series of requirements to be 
able to receive amounts like this. As for your 
compressed work week, there is not enough time in 
the week now to get what we need done (I am a 
CIWS Tech) so I do not speak for all rates.  Some 
of us do this [10-hr days] already 5/6 days a 
week and love our jobs. What kills our motivation 
is when the Navy gives and gives and gives to 
those who produce nothing.  I am not a 
disgruntled Sailor and I plan on retiring.  I did 
get $45,000 a few years ago when I reenlisted, 
but I worked extremely hard for it.  I do enjoy 
my job and appreciate what the Navy had offered 
me.  Unfortunately, I am seeing way too many 
first class and chief petty officers getting out 
with 10,14,16 years of service.  And the reason 
is because the ‘Navy is changing.’  I do agree 
heavily on billet choice, geographic stability, 
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and transferring of the GI Bill.  These are the 
things we need to really consider.  Making a 
Sailor and his family happy are key to morale at 
commands. 
OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO 
Deployment schedule, sea/shore rotation, and time 
away from family continued to be of primary concern to 
these participants.  14% of those who answered gave a 
suggestion to improve these areas.  Respondent 621751867 
stated: 
The main reason why I will not reenlist is due to 
the under-manning and increased demand while at 
sea.  I have to do almost twice the amount of 
work with almost half the manning from when I was 
on my first ship.  I am not impressed or 
convinced the new ‘business model’ for the Navy 
is effective.  This is the military not a Fortune 
500 company.  I have little time to pursue 
personal goals while on active sea duty where 
FC's have to be.  The new ship's schedules are 
non-stop.  It is possible to take PACE and 
distance learning classes, but time and internet 
constraints make it difficult.  If our sea/shore 
rotation could be altered to allow FC's more time 
on shore to allow degree pursuits, professional 
certifications and spend more time with family.  
More quality training facilities need to be 
utilized for our new Sailors.  Computer-based 
learning is not as effective as having a seasoned 
technician teach.  The possibility to do back-to-
back shore would also be a good incentive.  Give 
people time to finish up a degree, raise a child, 
or simply take a break from the rigors of sea 
duty.  
Extra Leave 
Just over 13% of the respondents indicated they 
would like to purchase additional leave or liberty days in 
lieu of part of their SRB.  Many gave dollar amounts that 
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ranged from $250 per day to $10,000 for an increase to 
sixty days per year.  These responses highlight another 
potential non-monetary incentive that is not currently 
being considered and has the potential to be a very cost 
effective option.80  
Modifications to Survey Items 
Just under 12% of respondents offered suggestions 
that were similar to our survey items, but with 
modifications.  For example, some indicated they would be 
willing to forgo some of their SRB for 6 months to a year 
to finish their degree, but on active duty versus on a 
sabbatical.  Respondent 621309181 stated:   
Guaranteed education benefits for reenlisting, 
i.e., - reenlist, and the Navy will give the s/m 
the option of 12 months of paid college benefits 
at the end of the tour (to count as shore duty) 
s/m could work a shift schedule at recruiting 
station or other duty station or evening/weekend 
schedule - with no cap on the amount of hours to 
be taken within 12 month cycle; this could be 
very attractive to individuals who would like a 
fleet sabbatical to improve their education - 
just a thought - bonus reduction of $7,500; 
designating parking would be an improvement - 
$1000; compressed work schedule - $1,000.” 
Purpose of SRB 
A small, but significant, number of respondents 
seemed to misunderstand the purpose of the SRB.  Perhaps, 
because it is called a “bonus,” the perception is that it 
is some kind of reward for service. 
 
80 Per-day salary is $180/day for a Sailor making $45,000 per year. 
This assumes 5 days per week, 50 weeks per year. 
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For example, respondent 622473320 stated, “[The] 
SRB for re-enlisting should be higher for those that have 
committed to doing a career in the Navy.”  The reality is 
the exact opposite:  the SRB should be lower -- not higher 
-- for those who have committed to a Navy career.  This is 
because these are the types of Sailors who do not need to 
be paid much of a bonus to induce reenlistment.  Instead, 
higher bonuses should be paid (must be paid) to those 
Sailors most reluctant to commit to a career in the Navy. 
Respondent 623843938 stated, “I realize there is 
rank in the military, but I often find it disheartening and 
laughable that I receive the same paycheck as a second 
class BM who scrapes paint all day.”  This individual is 
not factoring his SRB, that the Boatswains Mate (BM) does 
not receive, which significantly increases his wage above 
other sailors of the same rank.  Career counselors and 
leading Chiefs should continue counseling Sailors on their 
entire compensation package to ensure they truly understand 
the benefits they are receiving. 
Increased Shore Duty Options 
Over 5% indicated they would like to have better 
shore duty options.  Almost 70% of those were FCs.  The 
biggest complaint was that FCs are limited to Recruit 
Training Command, recruiting duty, or instructor billets in 
Dahlgren, Virginia. 
Individual Augmentation (IA) 
Although only 4% of the open responses mentioned 
IAs, it was also stated in 2% of the responses as the 
primary reason for declining the SRB and, thus, deserves 
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discussion.  Respondent 621567958 stated, “Shrink 
deployment times and get rid of IA requirements.  We choose 
to join the Navy for many reasons, some of us love going to 
sea, patriotism, college money.  However, I assure you, 
especially for those that have been in for more then 5 
years, no one wanted and few a[re] willing to accept the 
challenge of a 6-18 month IA.” 
E. SUMMARY 
Although monetary compensation continues to be a 
significant motivator of retention, non-monetary aspects of 
military life are clearly important to these Enlisted 
Sailors.  The survey produced evidence of dissatisfaction 
with current benefits distribution and offerings and 
potential retention benefits from the proposed non-monetary 
incentives offered in this research. 
Although many of the value distributions for the non-
monetary incentives have a large cluster at zero dollars, 
there are smaller clusters at certain substantial “focal” 
values.  The tails include a few high values (some as high 
as 50,000 dollars or more).  These distributions underscore 
the challenges of applying a “one-size-fits-all” 
compensation package in terms of Sailor satisfaction and 
cost-effectiveness and provide evidence to support tailored 
retention packages designed to maximize the benefit to each 





V. RETENTION MECHANISM ALTERNATIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter II, the current system of 
determining bonus levels is sub-optimal.  Strength planners 
do not currently possess a tool that allows them to 
pinpoint the exact market clearing bonus level.  The result 
is either retention deficits or surpluses. 
Moreover, despite budgeting more than $350 million per 
year on retention incentives for enlisted personnel alone, 
the Navy has, in recent years, failed to meet a number of 
its retention goals. Thus, it is also important to evaluate 
whether an alternative retention mechanism, beyond the 
strictly monetary incentives currently employed, might more 
cost-effectively achieve the Navy’s retention objectives.  
This chapter introduces several alternative mechanisms 
for (1) identifying precisely which personnel should 
receive a retention or re-enlistment bonus and (2) 
determining the appropriate magnitude and composition of 
such a bonus.  These mechanisms include alternatives which 
employ strictly monetary incentives as well as alternatives 
which incorporate non-monetary incentives into the 
retention bonus. 
The next section describes mechanisms which utilize 
monetary incentives alone -- either employing a pre-
determined cash bonus amount or a cash bonus amount 
determined via auction.  The final two alternatives involve 
non-monetary incentives incorporated into a Total Rewards 
package.  For example, the Universal Incentive Package 
(UIP) combines a common monetary incentive with a common 
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set of non-monetary incentives.  Each is offered to all who 
are selected for retention or reenlistment.  The concluding 
alternative is the Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism (CRAM).  This combines individualized monetary 
incentives with packages of non-monetary incentives.  These 
are “customized” for each individual Sailor. 
B. MONETARY RETENTION INCENTIVES ALONE 
The most straightforward approach to retention bonuses 
is to only use monetary incentives.  Determining the 
appropriate magnitude of this monetary incentive, however, 
can be problematic.  Generally speaking, the amount of the 
cash incentive can either be predetermined, using various 
estimation techniques, or it can be determined endogenously 
via auction or some other market mechanism. 
1. Predetermined Incentive Amount 
As discussed in Chapter II, the size or amounts of the 
Selected Reenlistment Bonuses are predetermined using 
historical data combined with present economic conditions, 
such as unemployment rate and civilian-military pay gap.  
Unfortunately, as shown in Figure 16, this model is not a 
perfect predictor and can result in under-manning (or 
under-payment) in some ratings and over-manning (or over-









Figure 16.   Disadvantages of a Predetermined SRB Level 
2. Determined via Auction 
A properly designed retention auction would inject 
accuracy into the SRB level setting process.  Coughlan and 
Gates argue that retention auctions offer the promise of 
being: 
1. Precise: 
a. Retain the precise number of service members 
desired. 
b. Identify which individual service members to 
retain. 
2. Cost Effective: 
a. Endogenously determine minimum bonus necessary 
to achieve goals… 
3. Voluntary: 
a. Pay each retained service member no less than 
amount requested in bid for retention. 
b. Exclude only those service members who 
requested more than (or at least as much as) 
amount paid to any retained service member. 
4. Efficient: 
a. Retain service members most willing to continue 
service.81 
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81 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates, and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM):  Creating 
Individualized Monetary & Non-monetary Incentive Packages,” 
(presentation, Defence and Economics Security Workshop, Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada, November 6, 2008). 
 74
A key question, however, is which type of auction 
would best suit the Navy?  
a. Open vs. Sealed-Bid Format  
By necessity, a Navy retention auction would be a 
reverse, multiple winner auction.  The single buyer would 
be the Navy and the sellers (of their labor) would be the 
Sailors.  NPC (the auctioneer) would pre-determine the 
number of winners within each rating (or NEC) based on end-
strength/manning requirements and budget constraints. 
The simplest and most understandable variation 
would be the first-price open bid auction.  It is, however, 
not feasible to simultaneously assemble all eligible 
Sailors (even virtually) to accomplish a real-time auction.  
The alternative is a sealed bid auction.  Therefore, a 
choice must be made between first and second-price 
determination. 
b. First-Price vs. Second-Price  
To compare the first-price vs. second-price 
auction formats in the retention context, there must be an 
understanding of the bidding strategies under each format. 
The optimal bidding strategy for a first price 
SRB auction is to inflate one’s bid above the true 
reservation value, or minimum willingness to accept (WTA), 
to maximize economic rent received.  Sailors must balance 
this strategy with the increased likelihood of “losing” the 
auction by overbidding. 
In particular, the optimal bidding strategy for a 
risk-neutral bidder in a first-price reverse auction is to 
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bid his estimate of the lowest WTA amount among the losing 
bidders.  More precisely, if k Sailors will be retained 
within a particular rating, the equilibrium bidding 
strategy is for each Sailor to bid what he expects to be 
the k+1st lowest WTA amount (conditional on the assumption 
that the bidder’s WTA amount is among the lowest k WTA 
amounts). 
To better understand this, note that the Sailors 
can expect that no Sailor will bid below his WTA amount.  
Thus, a Sailor is guaranteed to be one of the k “winners” 
in the auction so long as he bids below the k+1st lowest 
WTA amount among the Sailors bidding.  Thus, each Sailor is 
trying to bid as high as he can (above his true WTA amount) 
and still be a winner. 
It is not clear, however, that Sailors will 
possess the requisite information on other sailor WTA 
amounts to estimate the k+1st lowest WTA amount.  In the 
best case, bids will simply be inflated somewhat 
arbitrarily.  In the worst case, the “wrong” Sailors, those 
less willing, will be retained.  To retain them in 
subsequent auctions will likely result in higher retention 
costs. 
For a second-price single-winner auction, Chapter 
II demonstrated that truthful revelation is the only 
rational strategy.  The same holds true – using a similar 
logic that will not be spelled out here – for second-price 
multiple-winner auctions. The problem with this type of 
auction is convincing less savvy participants that it is in 
their best interest to bid truthfully.  Mandatory training 
and practice auctions would be necessary to ensure 
personnel understand their optimal strategy. 
c. Cost Equivalence of Auction Types 
With the bidding strategies under both the first-
price and second-price retention auction articulated, it is 
important to note that the monetary cost of each type of 
auction is virtually equivalent.  In all Enlisted Retention 
Auction formats, the Sailors who cost the Navy the least, 
or have the lowest willingness to accept (WTA), will be 
retained.  If one assumes Sailors will not bid less than 
the minimum amount they would be willing-to-accept for 
retention, the only concern is with the possibility of 
over-bidding to maximize economic rent.  In Figure 17, the 
red line represents the optimal first-price auction bids 
and the blue line represents second-price auction bids (in 























First Rejected Bid:         $45,100
Total Cost:                 $3,382,500
Sailors  
Figure 17.   Cost-Equivalence of First and Second-Price 
Auctions (After Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)82 
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82 Coughlan et al., CRAM presentation. 
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In the first price auction, the trade-off between 
risk of non-retention and the reward of economic rent 
determines the optimal strategy.  A risk-neutral Sailor 
will bid what he assumes to be the lowest WTA amount among 
the losing bidders (conditional on his own WTA amount being 
among the winning WTA amounts).  This results in an 
efficient mechanism:  the Sailors who are most willing to 
remain on active duty are retained.  Significant economic 
rent, however, is paid to those individuals who would have 
stayed for less.  This is the distance between the red and 
blue line for each Sailor.  Additionally, Sailors may have 
difficulty determining the proper bid.  This may reduce the 
likelihood of retaining those most willing to remain in the 
service.83 
In the second-price auction example in Figure 17, 
the 75 cheapest Sailors are retained for the price of the 
76th Sailor’s WTA -- in this example, $45,100, for a total 
cost of $3,382,500.  The green triangle represents the 
Navy’s reduction in bonus payments (to the highest WTA 
sailors retained) over the first price auction.  The red 
triangle shows the Navy’s increase in bonus payments (to 
the lowest WTA Sailors retained) over the first price 
auction.  These two numbers cancel each other and the 
result is the equivalent cost to the Navy under both 
mechanisms.  What is not clearly equivalent is Sailor 
value.  This model assumes that Sailors will accurately 
predict their optimum bid and place it accordingly.  
Sailors who would be retained under their true reservation  
 
 
83 Coughlan et al., CRAM presentation. 
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values might incorrectly estimate their place in the 
distribution.  Thus, they may overbid in the first-price 
auction and not be retained. 
3. Second-Price Retention Auction Example 
Suppose the Navy wishes to retain two out of three 
sailors who bid their true reservation values of $80,000, 
$90,000, and $100,000, respectively.  Under the second 
price auction mechanism, Sailors 1 and 2 would be retained 
for $100,000 each for a total cost of $200,000.  Sailor 1 
would receive a surplus of $20,000 and Sailor 2’s surplus 
would be $10,000.  This example will be further developed 
in Section D.3 to include the Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism.  
C. UNIVERSAL INCENTIVE PACKAGE (UIP) 
1. Description and Purpose  
The simplest way to incorporate non-monetary 
incentives (NMI) is to offer a “one-size-fits-all” package 
that combines a predetermined portfolio of NMIs coupled 
with a cash bonus.  To reach retention goals more 
efficiently than with money alone, the cash payments must 
be reduced sufficiently to cover the cost of providing the 
NMIs.  If the Sailors value these NMIs more than the Navy’s 
cost to provide them, the total value delivered to Sailors 
exceeds the cost of delivery. 
The participants would be offered a fixed package of 
incentives and would submit a cash (requirement) bid to 
supplement that package.  The auction would then follow the 
same process as the monetary-only auction. 
2. Determining which Incentives to Include  
The main difficulty when designing a Universal Package 
is determining which incentives to include.  There will be 
a surplus to the Navy for NMIs where Sailor value exceeds 
cost and a deficit associated with NMIs where Sailor value 
is less than cost (see Figure 18). 
    
Figure 18.   Cost vs. Value of Non-Monetary Incentives (After 
Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)84 
Since all who desire the incentive will receive it, 
there is potential for significant deficit to the Navy in 
offering incentives whose cost exceeds the majority of 
Sailor values.  In Figure 19, if the demand curves shown 
represent valuations among retained sailors, it would be 
cost effective to offer choices a and b.  This is because 
total Sailor value exceeds cost.  Choices c and d, however, 
would result in a deficit.  This is because total Sailor 
value is less than total cost. 
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84 Coughlan et al., CRAM presentation. 
 
Figure 19.   Non-Monetary Incentives Portfolio (After Coughlan 
et al., CRAM Presentation)85 
3. Optimal Universal NMI Package 
a. Description 
Providing an NMI as part of a retention bonus 
package reduces each Sailor’s minimum cash retention bonus 
required by the value of that particular NMI to that 
particular Sailor.  Including a particular NMI as part of 
the Universal Incentive Package will reduce total Navy 
retention costs only if the total surplus among retained 
Sailors (value – cost summed over all retained Sailors with 
value > cost) exceeds the total deficit (cost – value 
summed over all retained Sailors with value < cost) for 
that NMI.  More directly, the optimal Universal Incentive 
Package for the Navy would only offer those incentives 
where the surplus exceeds the deficit (among retained 
Sailors).  
 80
                     
85 Coughlan et al., CRAM presentation. 
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b. Problem: Truthful Revelation 
At the time retention decisions (and potential 
auction bids) are made, the incentive package must already 
be determined.  Thus, to construct the optimal Universal 
Incentive Package, planners must discover the value 
distribution of prospective incentives among prospective 
retained Sailors prior to the retention decision point.  
Sailors, unfortunately, would not have an incentive to 
truthfully reveal their NMI values prior to the retention 
decision point if they knew the NMI package information 
they provided would determine the package of NMIs that all 
Sailors would receive for free. 
4. Including NMI based on Sailor Feedback 
a. Value More or Less than Cost 
A possible approach to the problem of identifying 
appropriate incentives to include in the UIP would be to 
publish the cost of the incentives and ask Sailors if they 
value said incentive as much or more than that cost.  The 
problem with this approach is that respondents may inflate 
their values to ensure that an incentive will be offered. 
b. Relevant Population 
Furthermore, only the valuations among retained 
Sailors are appropriate for determining what incentives 
should be included in the universal package.  The set of 
retained Sailors is the population that will determine if 
the NMI total value exceeds its total cost.  Sailors not 
retained may have high values for some NMIs, but their 
values will not be realized if they are not retained. 
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Therefore, it would be difficult to know which Sailors to 
include in any poll of NMI values. 
c. Determining Usage Rate 
The question still remains:  At what level of 
Sailor value should NMIs be included in the package?  As 
discussed, this answer depends on the value distribution of 
the retained Sailors as well as how many retained Sailors 
actually use the incentives.  More extensive surveys are 
required to draw conclusions about the value distributions 
of Navy Sailors.  All of the value distributions from the 
Enlisted Retention Survey, however, were heavily 
concentrated to the left (low values) with a large cluster 
of values at zero, but with a long tail to the right (high 
values).  The Sabbatical example in Figure 20 has 59% of 
its values at zero, a skewness of 2.79, but a maximum value 
of $65,000.  The median value is zero dollars. 
For this sample, if the cost to provide a one-
year sabbatical to a Sailor is $4,370, only 27.2% of the 
Sailors value the incentive more than its cost.  If the 
Navy retained all of these Sailors and all received and 
used the Sabbatical option, the total NMI value (VNMI) minus 
total NMI cost (CNMI) would be a loss of $24 –- essentially 
the break-even point.  For the sake of illustration, all 
Sailors are retained.  In contrast, if the cost is just $70 
less ($4,300), VNMI - CNMI would be a gain of $42,185.  This 
is true even though the same percentage of individuals 
values it more than it costs.  If the cost is $70 more 
($4,440), the total VNMI - CNMI would be a negative $42,234.   
Mean        4,706
Mode (59%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile        5,000 
90th Percentile       15,000 
95th Percentile       25,000 
Maximum      65,000 
  
Figure 20.   Value Distribution for One Year Sabbatical 
The 75th percentile value for this value 
distribution is $5,000.  If Sabbaticals cost the Navy $5000 
with this sample, the Navy would save $1,615,085.  That is, 
if it offered Sabbaticals in the NMI package and only those 
who placed positive value on it actually used it.  This is 
probably not realistic:  a Sailor may not be willing to 
forgo some of his bonus to receive a benefit, but he may 
use it if it is offered for free.  For example, a single 
Sailor may not place a value on his commissary benefits, 
but he may occasionally use the facility.  With this 
sample, the Navy would lose $379,914 by offering the one-
year Sabbatical option under the $5,000 cost scenario if 
everyone (all 603 Sailors in the sample) used it.  This 
clearly illustrates how crucial offerings determination is 
with the Universal package. 
5. Potential Benefits and Limitations  
For the Universal Incentive Package to be cost-
effective, it should include only those incentives where 
total Sailor Value exceeds total cost to provide.  In the 
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optimally designed UIP, NMIs a and b in Figure 21 would be 
included; NMIs c and d would not.  This package design has 
the potential to save the Navy money.  This assumes that 
Sailor values and likelihood of use can be accurately 
predicted.  Unfortunately, discovering these values and 
probabilities can be problematic and the results could be 
disastrous.  The above example showed a net result of 
offering Sabbatical ranging from a savings of $1.6 million 
to a cost of approximately $379 thousand.  This depended on 
which Sailors actually used the benefit.  Finally, the UIP 
is not Pareto optimal, i.e., there is still room for 
improvement.  The potential benefits available by offering 
incentives c and d in Figure 21 would not be realized with 
UIP. 
 
Figure 21.   Limitations of a Universal Incentive Package 
(After Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)86 
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86 Coughlan et al., CRAM presentation. 
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D. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM (CRAM) 
1. Overview  
The CRAM incorporates three elements -- each 
serves a separate purpose: 
(1) Second Price Auction provides accuracy in 
setting bonus level; 
(2) Non-monetary incentives provide lower cost to 
retain Sailors with value > cost for those NMIs; 
(3) Combinatorial auction provides individualized 
incentive packages with no "wasted" incentives.87 
Under the CRAM, a retained Sailor receives a 
particular NMI only if he values the incentive more than it 
costs the Navy to provide.  This eliminates the need to 
determine which incentives to offer.  All incentives are 
offered to all Sailors and allocated to those whose value 
exceeds cost.  For those non-monetary incentives whose cost 
varies significantly depending on the number of 
participants, there are a number of variations of the CRAM 
which can be adopted to accommodate such varying 
(presumably increasing) unit cost.  This includes the use 
of equilibrium prices (where the supply or marginal cost 
curve intersects the demand or value curve), average costs 
or quantity limits (quotas) for each NMI. 
2. Process Description 
The CRAM Auction is very similar to the auctions used 
for monetary retention and the Universal Incentive Package 
described above.  Each Sailor bids the minimum SRB he would 
 
87 Peter J. Coughlan, email message to the author, November 2, 2008. 
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require if the retention incentive was cash-only.  For each 
non-monetary incentive, each Sailor also indicates the 
reduction in his cash bonus that would be acceptable if 
that non-monetary incentive were included in his retention 
package. 
After receiving these bids, the auctioneer calculates 
the minimum cost package required to retain each Sailor.  
Each minimum cost package includes any NMI where the 
Sailor’s value exceeds the Navy’s cost.  To calculate his 
provisional cash bonus, the Sailor’s required cash-only 
bonus is reduced by the value he placed on the NMI(s) in 
his initial bid.  The Navy’s total cost of those incentives 
is then added to the provisional cash bonus to derive the 
Sailor’s effective cost to the Navy -- or the Navy’s total 
cost of the package bid. 
Once each Sailor’s minimum cost package bid is 
calculated, the set of lowest cost Sailors is retained.  
Each retained Sailor receives the NMIs included in his 
individualized package plus a cash bonus that is equal to 
the cost of the first excluded package bid minus the cost 
of his set of incentives.  Note that each Sailor receives a 
retention package of the same total cost to the Navy. 
Because each Sailor has different NMI packages and 
values, the value of the retention incentive will vary 
across Sailors.  Every Sailor, however, will receive value 
that equals or exceeds the Navy’s cost.  In some cases, a 
Sailor’s value may significantly exceed the Navy’s cost.88 
 
88 Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation. 
3. Process Example 
The example in Figure 22 continues the example from 
section B.3 above.  In this example, three Sailors bid 
their minimum required cash-only SRB (truthfully, given 
that this is a generalized second-price auction) and each 
states the dollar amount of that bonus he would sacrifice 
for each of the 2 available NMIs.  The cost to provide each 
NMIs is assumed to be $20,000 per Sailor. 
Each Sailor’s minimum cost package bid would include 
any NMI for which his value exceeds cost.  Thus, given the 
values shown in Figure 22, Sailor 1’s package bid would 
include incentive 1; Sailor 2’s package bid would include 
incentive 2; and Sailor 3’s package bid would include both 
incentives.  The auctioneer then calculates a revised 
minimum cash bonus to retain.  This is the original cash 
bonus bid minus the sum of the stated values for each NMI 
included in the package bid.  Each Sailor’s minimum cost to 
retain is then this revised minimum cash bonus plus the 
total cost of any NMIs included in the package bid. 
   
 
Figure 22.   Enlisted Retention Example:  CRAM  (After 
Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)89 
                     
87
89 Coughlan et al., CRAM presentation. 
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As shown, if the Navy wishes to retain two of these 
three Sailors, Sailors 1 and 3 would be retained as they 
have the two lowest total costs to retain.  Each of these 
retained Sailors would receive the NMIs which were included 
in his package bid.  Also each would receive a cash bonus 
equal to the total cost of the first excluded package bid 
($80,000 in the example) minus the total cost of the NMIs 
included in his package bid. 
4. The Advantage of CRAM 
 The example in Figure 22 illustrates the money-saving 
potential of the CRAM Auction.  Under a second-price 
retention auction with monetary incentives alone, Sailors 1 
and 2 would be retained for a cash bonus equal to the first 
excluded cash bonus bid.  This is the bid of $100,000 
submitted by Sailor 3.  Thus, the total cost to retain 
these two Sailors would be $200,000. 
Under the CRAM, however, Sailors 1 and 3 would each be 
retained at a cost equal to the total cost of the first 
excluded package bid.  This is the cost of $80,000 
associated with Sailor 2’s minimum cost package bid.  Thus, 
the total cost to retain these two Sailors under CRAM would 
be $160,000. 
Under CRAM, the same number of Sailors was retained at 
a lower cost to the Navy.  This could potentially increase 
the Sailor surplus.  This is possible only because the 
mechanism substitutes cash SRB payments with NMIs of the 
same cost to individuals who place different values on 
them.  These values, however, are greater or no less than 
the Navy’s cost.  Each Sailor receives at least the same 
surplus he would have received under the monetary auction, 
but at a lower cost to the Navy:  a true win-win situation. 
CRAM is able to overcome the weakness of the Universal 
incentive package by capturing the Navy surplus, 
represented by the green triangles in Figure 23, and 
eliminating the waste, depicted by the red triangles.  CRAM 
also captures the surplus from incentives that would not be 
offered under the UIP.  This is represented by the blue 
triangles in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23.   CRAM overcomes the Universal Package Weakness 
(After Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)90 
Further, CRAM eliminates the difficulties involved in 
identifying the optimal universal incentive package:  
truthful revelation of the NMI values, identifying the 
relevant (retained) population of Sailors, and predicting 
the actual NMI usage rate. 
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90 Coughlan et al., CRAM presentation. 
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Finally, note that CRAM offers the potential to change 
the “mix” of Sailors retained.  In the example above, 
Sailors 1 and 2 were retained under a strictly monetary 
retention auction.  Sailors 1 and 3 were retained under 
CRAM.  The potential impact of CRAM on population diversity 





VI. SIMULATION DESIGN AND RESULTS 
A. DESIGN 
1. General 
Using the data from the Enlisted Retention Survey, 
simulations of the various retention mechanism alternatives 
were conducted.  In particular, three separate reverse 
second-price auction mechanisms were simulated:  Monetary, 
UIP, and CRAM. 
To conduct the UIP and CRAM simulations in particular, 
some estimate of the marginal (or average) cost of each NMI 
was necessary.  In the absence of specific cost estimates 
for the various NMIs, costs were based on the value 
distributions from questions 5-11 in the survey.  While the 
exact cost of each NMI is unknown at this time, it is 
reasonable (based on the broad range of submitted values) 
to assume that the cost of each NMI falls somewhere between 
zero (the minimum and modal value for each NMI) and the 
maximum submitted valuation (between $25,000 and $90,000, 
depending on the NMI).  Thus, it seemed reasonable to 
simulate NMI costs as falling within the range (or some 
sub-range) of the submitted valuations. 
To provide the broadest generality of results, two 
cost assignment methods were used:  Varying Percentile Cost 
(All Positive (VP(AP))) and Varying Percentile Cost (High 
Positive (VP(HP))).  In both approaches, the cost of each 
NMI was drawn from a subset of the values for that NMI as 
submitted by Sailors in the Enlisted Retention Survey.  In 
particular, for each simulation trial and for each NMI, a 
random number was drawn from a uniform distribution between 
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0% and 100%.  Then, for that simulation trial, the cost of 
the NMI was set equal to the submitted value which 
corresponded to that randomly drawn percentile. 
In the VP(AP) method, the lower bound for the cost of 
each NMI was based on the percentile that included the 
first positive value from the respondents’ answers.  Thus, 
the cost of each NMI was drawn from the range of positive 
submitted values for that NMI.  To give a more conservative 
(high) estimate of the costs, the VP(HP) method set the 
lower bound halfway between the first positive percentile 
and 100, or the median of the VP(AP) cost possibilities.   
Both costing schemes assumed constant marginal costs.  
Additionally, the NMI values were assumed to be additive 
for Sailors who received more than one incentive -- unless 
another value was given by the respondent.  Similarly, 
costs were assumed to be additive for multiple NMIs. 
Each Mechanism was simulated at the 25, 50, and 75% 
retention levels (see Table 4).  For perspective, the 
Navy’s current overall Zone A, B, and C reenlistment rate 






    
 
91 Chief of Naval Operations, 2008 Stay Navy Campaign Guidance, DTG 
101233Z December 07 (Washington, D.C.: 2007). 
Table 4.   Simulation Varieties 
 
2. Monetary Only Simulation 
To simulate the monetary-only auction, each Sailor’s 
answer from question 4 was used to determine his required 
SRB.  The Sailors were then ranked from most to least 
expensive.  The lowest set of n Sailors was retained and 
each paid the cash bonus of the first excluded bid (i.e., 
the n+1st lowest bid).  The number of Sailors retained (n) 
varied according to the retention levels in Table 4. 
3. UIP Simulation 
To simulate UIP, it was necessary to determine the 
appropriate rule for including NMIS in the Universal 
Package.  To be the most "generous" to UIP and, thus, 
conservative with respect to CRAM's relative performance, 
the researchers chose a cutoff that was close to optimal 
for UIP.  Although in actual practice, this optimal cutoff 
would likely be impossible to determine. 
The optimal cost cutoff for each NMI was calculated by 
determining the percentile for which the total Sailor 
surplus (value minus cost summed over all Sailors with 
93 
value greater than cost) equaled the total deficit (cost 
minus value summed over all Sailors with value less than 
cost).  
Figure 24 illustrates the optimal UIP cutoff 
percentile for each NMI.  This is based on the sample’s 
value distribution.  It is important to note that these 
cutoffs are only truly optimal if the retained Sailor value 
distribution matches the overall Sailor value distribution.  
If the retained Sailors actually value the NMIs more than 
the overall population, the optimal percentile would be 
higher.  Conversely, if the retained Sailors actually value 
the NMIs less than the overall population, the optimal 
percentile would be lower. 
 
Figure 24.   Optimal UIP Cutoff Percentile 
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Under the UIP mechanism, any NMI that the Navy offers 
will be available to all reenlisting Sailors.  All Sailors 
expressing a positive value for this incentive will clearly 
choose to use the incentive.  Some Sailors that do not 
express a willingness to pay for the NMI may still take 
advantage of the opportunity given that the incentive is 
offered at no charge.  Thus, a Sailor might have responded 
in the survey that provision of a particular NMI would not 
reduce his minimum required SRB at all.  The same Sailor 
might, nonetheless, use that NMI if it were offered to him 
free of charge. 
To determine the total cost of retaining these 
Sailors, three assumptions about usage of NMIs included in 
a UIP were compared: 
1. UIP(0)- Only those Sailors who placed a positive 
value on the NMI will actually use it; 
2. UIP(50)- 50% of those who place no value on the 
NMI will also use it; 
3. UIP(100) – Everyone retained will use the NMI. 
Because the actual usage rate would be somewhere 
between UIP(0) and UIP(100), the average optimal cutoff 
would be approximately the 75th percentile, as is shown in 
Table 5. 
 






















































































UIP0 68.0% 89.4% 75.8% 88.6% 85.2% 78.8% 82.9% 85.6% 85.6% 82.8% 97.3% 93.0% 91.2% 84.9% 85.6%
UIP50 67.7% 79.4% 74.3% 78.4% 76.8% 77.3% 71.6% 76.6% 75.5% 70.0% 93.2% 88.2% 83.3% 77.9% 76.8%
UIP100 67.3% 77.1% 73.5% 72.8% 75.8% 66.5% 69.8% 75.8% 74.5% 68.8% 91.4% 87.6% 71.8% 74.8% 73.5%  
95 
 96
Because it was consistent with the data regarding the 
optimal cutoff and it was a simple, functional cutoff rule 
(rather than, for example, using a different cutoff rule 
for each NMI or using some precise cutoff rule, such as 
77.9%), the 75th percentile cost cutoff was used in the 
simulations.  Additionally, by using the 75th percentile 
cutoff rule, the UIP included only those NMIs where at 
least 25% of the Sailors valued it more than its cost to 
provide.  This included most of the NMIs, but not those 
whose costs would exceed more than 75% of the Sailor 
values.  
Note that the simulations using the VP(AP) costing 
scheme never offered two NMIs in the UIP (barracks room on 
sea duty and BAH on sea duty) because their first positive 
values occurred at the 88th and 84th percentiles, 
respectively.  Under the VP(HP) costing scheme, only three 
NMIs were offered in the UIP.  The other 10 NMIs’ costs 
always exceeded the cutoff percentile.  This determination 
worked to the advantage of the UIP by preventing many 
situations where NMI cost would exceed total Sailor value. 
In simulating the Universal Incentive Package, the 
initial SRB requirement was derived the same way as in the 
monetary auction:  from the values the Sailors provided in 
the survey.  The NMI values from questions 5-11 were then 
used to determine the value each Sailor placed on each 
incentive.  If an incentive was included in the package, 
the Sailor’s initial SRB was reduced by the stated value 
placed on that NMI to generate a “provisional” SRB bid for 
that Sailor.  This simulated the process by which a Sailor 
would bid, given a fixed package of incentives.  Note, that 
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under a UIP retention program, the Navy would not observe 
the Sailor’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the non-monetary 
incentives.  Rather, the Navy would only observe their 
adjusted SRB bid.  The Sailors were then ranked, as before, 
but based on their new provisional SRB bids.  Each retained 
Sailor received a monetary SRB equal to the first excluded 
provisional bid. 
Retained Sailors were all eligible for the same cash 
bonus and a standardized NMI package, but each Sailor had a 
unique “value” for the NMIs offered, depending on his 
individual preferences. 
4. CRAM Simulation 
The CRAM simulations used the same initial SRB (SRBI), 
NMI value (ValueNMI) and NMI cost (CostNMI) determinations as 
above.  Provisional SRB (SRBP), however, was determined 
differently than with the universal package.  With this 
mechanism, the Navy would observe both the Sailor’s SRB bid 
and the value he attributes to each NMI.  In the 
simulations, a Sailor was allocated an NMI only if his 
value exceeded the cost (i.e., Sailor surplus was 
positive).  His provisional SRB (SRBP) was then set equal to 
his initial SRB minus his value for each NMI allocated.  
Sailors were retained, however, based on effective cost 
(CostE) to the Navy, using the following formula: 
CostE = SRBP + CostNMI 
where the CostNMI amounts were summed only over those NMIs 
allocated to that Sailor (i.e., those for which value 
exceeded cost). 
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Sailors were then ranked from highest to lowest 
effective cost and the least expensive set was retained.  
The Navy’s total cost of each individual retention package 
was equal to the CostE of the first excluded bidder: 
SRBI - ValueNMI + CostNMI. 
The cash award for each individual Sailor was 
determined by subtracting the cost of each allocated NMI 
from the Navy’s total cost of the retention package.  Thus, 
each retained Sailor had the same cost to the Navy (equal 
to the CostE of the first excluded bidder).  The cash award, 
however, depended on how many incentives he received and 
their individual costs. 
The value each Sailor received equaled his cash SRB 
plus his value for any allocated NMIs.  Values varied 
across Sailors depending on the number of NMIs allocated 
and the stated value to each Sailor. Nonetheless, in all 
cases the value each retained Sailor received equaled or 
exceeded the cost to the Navy of providing the retention 
incentive package. 
5. Simulation Runs 
For each retention level described in Table 4, 1,000 
trials were simulated to obtain an adequate range of 
outcomes.  Both UIP and CRAM results were compared to the 
monetary auction.  It is important to note that these 
comparisons assume costs that were allowed to range over 
the positive portion of value distributions with upper 
bounds commonly as large as $50,000 or more.  If true NMI 
costs are, in fact, in the lower range of the value 
distribution, the savings over monetary incentives may be 
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significantly understated while, if true costs are in the 
upper range of the value distribution, the savings over 
monetary incentives may be significantly overstated. 
B. RESULTS 
Recall the two cost assignment methods used:  Varying 
Percentile Cost, All Positive (VP(AP)), and Varying 
Percentile Cost, (High Positive (VP(HP)).  In the VP(AP) 
method, the lower bound for each NMI was based on the 
percentile that included the first positive value from the 
respondents’ answers.  The VP(HP) method set the lower 
bound halfway between the first positive percentile and 
100, or the median of the VP(AP).  Table 6 details the 
lower bound, mean, median, and maximum dollar amount for 
the entire VP(AP).  It also details the lower bound and 
median for the VP(HP).  The VP(AP) mean costs in column 4 
provide plausible cost estimates; however, to be 
conservative, the upper half of the VP(AP) range was also 
sampled to simulate the possibility of higher actual costs. 
It is clear from the figure that the VP(AP) lower 
bound cost estimates are probably too low as they range 
from $1 to $13.  What is not clear is where the estimated 
costs become reasonable.  For example, to provide the 
Second Class Petty Officer (with two dependents) from 
Chapter II with a one year Sabbatical would cost at least 
$6,785 (within the VP(AP) lower half).  The example quotes 
that amount to provide medical, dental, vision, and 
commissary benefits to that Sailor.  Additional costs of 
administering the program, retraining the individual, and 
potential lost productivity would add to that cost 
(possibly above the VP(HP) lower bound). 
Appendix C contains the detailed results from the 
VP(AP) method and Appendix D contains the detailed results 
from the VP(HP) method. 
 
Table 6.   Varying Cost Percentiles for NMI Cost Estimates  
Percentile Cost Percentile Cost Cost Percentile Cost Cost*
Homeport 35 $1 67.5 $10,000 $9,749 83.75 $10,000 $50,000
Platform 64 $1 82 $5,000 $7,066 91 $10,000 $50,000
Billet 40 $1 70 $5,000 $8,917 85 $10,000 $51,502
One Year 
Sabbatical 63.5 $1 81.75 $10,000 $12,917 90.875 $20,000 $65,000
Telecommuting 50 $13 75 $7,750 $11,661 87.5 $15,000 $70,000
Geographic 
Stability (2 tours) 51 $7 75.5 $5,539 $9,385 87.75 $10,000 $50,000
Geographic 
Stability (3 tours) 47 $1 73.5 $10,000 $12,460 86.75 $15,000 $80,000
Professional 
Certification 62 $1 81 $5,000 $9,524 90.5 $10,000 $60,000
Compressed Work 
Week 60 $1 80 $5,000 $8,157 90 $10,000 $41,026
Transferability of 
GI Bill 45.5 $1 72.75 $10,000 $12,405 86.375 $20,000 $75,000
Single Barracks 
Room on sea duty 88.5 $1 94.25 $3,000 $5,446 97.125 $5,650 $25,000
BAH on sea duty 84 $1 92 $5,400 $8,923 96 $10,000 $50,000





VP(HP) Lower Bound 




1. Varying Percentile (AP) Cost Results 
  As shown in Figure 25, the largest total dollar 
savings occurred at the highest retention level.  The total 
CRAM savings increases as the Navy retains more Sailors.   
100 
 
Figure 25.   Average Dollar Savings – VP(AP) 
While the total CRAM savings are higher at higher 
retention rates, so are total retention costs.  At lower 
retention rates, the Navy retains Sailors with particularly 
high NMI values and low monetary incentive requirements 
(high percentage CRAM savings).  The Navy is forced to 
retain Sailors with lower NMI values and higher monetary 
incentive requirements at higher retention rates (lower 
percentage CRAM savings).  Consequently, the percent 
savings gives the opposite results to total savings:  there 
was a higher percent savings at the lower retention levels.  
Figure 26 displays these results.  For the VP(AP) 
simulations, CRAM produced an average savings over monetary 
ranging from 34.3% to 80.4%.  UIP’s average savings over 
monetary was 4.3% (UIP(100)) to 44.9% (UIP(0)). 
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Figure 26.   Average Percent Savings – VP(AP) 
2. Varying Percentile (HP) Cost Results 
Recall that when many Sailors value an incentive more 
than its cost, the Universal Incentive Package can produce 
large benefits to the Navy.  This is shown in the green 
shaded area in examples a and b in Figure 27.  Because all 
Sailors who place any value on the incentive receive it 
(even if the Navy’s cost exceeds that value), there is also 
a potential for a significant deficit associated with this 
incentive.  This is shown in the red shaded areas in 
examples a and b in Figure 27.  For NMIs excluded from the 
universal package, as in examples c and d in Figure 27, 
potential savings might not be captured at all.  In this 
scenario, the Navy does not provide an incentive that is 
highly valued by some Sailors.   
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Figure 27.   Limitations of a Universal Incentive Package 
(After Coughlan et al., CRAM Presentation)92 
In the simulations, the Universal Incentive Package 
generally delivered cost savings compared to the monetary 
auction when the assumption UIP(0) was used.  In other 
words, this occurred when it was assumed that only Sailors 
who expressed a positive value for the NMI would actually 
use it.  Under the UIP(100) assumption (all retained 
Sailors use the NMI), however, the average result was a 
significant deficit to the Navy as shown in Figure 28. 
Because the Navy only included the three NMIs that 
were the least likely to have total cost exceed total 
Sailor value, the 75th percentile NMI cost cut-off provided 
an advantage to UIP.  Even with this advantage, the UIP 
often performed poorly. 
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92 Coughlan et al., CRAM presentation. 
 
Figure 28.   Average Dollar Savings VP(HP) 
C. THE CRAM ADVANTAGE 
The CRAM Package only allocates incentives to Sailors 
who value that incentive more than it costs.  This makes it 
the most efficient method of distributing benefits.  In 
every case, the CRAM Auction out-performed the Monetary 
Auction in terms of dollars and percent savings (see 
Appendices C and D).  CRAM beat the UIP in all cases as 
well.  Because only three NMIs were offered in the UIP, it 
is difficult to assess relative performance in terms of 
dollars saved in the VP(HP) trials.  The percentile cutoff 
worked to the advantage of UIP by not allowing excessively 
“wasteful” NMIs to be offered.  The percent savings shown 
in Figure 29 is an appropriate approximation. 
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Figure 29.   Percent Savings VP(HP) 
In the vast majority of cases, CRAM produced savings 
well above those of the UIP -- especially when 50% or more 
of the re-enlistees were assumed to use the non-monetary 
incentives (UIP(50)) and UIP(100)).  In the VP(HP) 
simulations, CRAM savings vs. monetary averaged from 25.5% 
to 39.9%.  UIP vs. monetary ranged from a deficit of 3.3% 
(UIP(100)) to a savings of only 4.8% (UIP(0)).  This was 
expected, i.e., CRAM only awards a Sailor an incentive if 
he values it more than it costs the Navy to provide and all 
incentives are offered -- even if they are only allocated 
to a few Sailors. 
105 
CRAM is able to overcome the weakness of the UIP by 
capturing the entire potential Navy surplus and eliminating 
the waste (cases where the Navy’s cost exceeds the Sailors’ 
value).  CRAM also captures the surplus from incentives 
that would not be offered under the Universal Incentive 
Package. 
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VII. LINKING PREFERENCES TO DIVERSITY 
As leaders, we must anticipate and embrace the 
demographic changes of tomorrow, and build a Navy 
that always reflects our Country’s make up. We 
must lead in ways that will continue to draw men 
and women to service to our Country and to our 
Navy. Diversity of thoughts, ideas, and 
competencies of our people, keeps our Navy 
strong, and empowers the protection of the very 
freedoms and opportunities we enjoy each and 
every day.93 
A. MOTIVATION 
Why is diversity important to the military?  If 
achieved prudently and purposefully, it can enhance the 
political legitimacy, social equity, and the effectiveness 
of our military institutions.  If applied arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or to achieve some notion of perfect 
representation, the resulting force will suffer on all 
three accounts.  
This section will address each of the three core areas 
of concern:  political legitimacy, social equity, and the 
effectiveness of the military, with respect to population 
representation, to bear out each one’s respective 
significance.  It will then address representation in terms 
of new hires, known as “accessions” in the military, versus 
career force structure.  Finally, it will discuss how, 
through reenlistment incentives, the military can achieve 
the optimal approximate representation desired/required by 
the society it is sworn to protect. 
 
93 Gary Roughead, ADM, USN, “Diversity Policy, 28 Feb 2008.”  Chief 
of Naval Operations, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/ldrDisplay.asp?m=253 (accessed 
April, 14, 2008). 
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B. STATISTICAL REPRESENTATION DEFINED 
Before discussing the three core areas of concern and 
how to address them, a brief discussion of statistical 
representation is necessary.   
It is important for the Nation’s population to be 
statistically represented in the military.  This does not 
mean “perfect representation.”  Rather, it means 
representation within the acceptable range determined by 
society:  acceptable approximate representation.94 But what 
defines the range of acceptable deviations from perfect 
representation is highly dependent on the current attitudes 
and priorities of the country as well as the current 
statutes in effect.  For example, prior to 1972 there was a 
statutory ceiling on the percentage of women allowed in the 
military.  It is no accident that the height of the women’s 
rights movement coincided with the lift on that 
restriction. 
The arguments that are made for moving toward or away 
from perfect statistical representation center around three 
areas: 
Military effectiveness -- meeting the need for 
personnel who are capable of performing military 
jobs; social equity -- spreading the burden of 
national defense across all segments of the 







94 Mark Eitelberg, “Military Representation Model,” 
https://nps.blackboard.com/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp?tab_id=_2_1&url=
%2Fwebapps%2Fblackboard%2Fexecute%2Flauncher%3Ftype%3DCourse%26id%3D_33
55_1%26url%3D (accessed February 12, 2008). 
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the belief that the military ought to be part of 
society rather separate from it (Eitelberg, 
1977).95 
Dr. Eitelberg discusses these three issues as “a core 
of concern around an age old question:  Who shall serve 
when not all serve?”96  
Additionally, most often the military focuses on 
accessions and shifts policies to affect enlistment 
proportions while ignoring the reality that many of the 
“undesirable” representation issues are a function of who 
chooses to stay versus who chooses to join.97  Perfect 
representation is not possible because, by its nature, the 
military is exclusionary:  there are age limits, physical 
ability minimums, and fitness standards that are necessary 
to ensure minimum requirements for service.98  Even if the 
United States reinstated a random draft, it could not 
achieve perfect representation due to these limitations.  
What is more interesting is trying to determine where the 
right level of representation lies and how to achieve it. 
C. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
Throughout its history, the United States has had a 
significant distrust of a standing Army.  This pattern can 
be traced back to the Revolutionary War when the 
Continental Army was disbanded after the colonies gained 
 
95 U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Social Representation in 
the U.S. Military, The Congress of the U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 5.  
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6746/89-CBO-044.pdf (accessed 
February, 26 2008). 
96 Eitelberg, Military Representation Model. 
97 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 15. 
98 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 14. 
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independence.  It has been borne out, time and again, 
following significant military campaigns.  The framers of 
the Constitution were influenced by their experiences with 
the ubiquitous armies of Europe and their oppression of the 
people they were bound to protect.  They recognized a need 
for a “common defense” but were leery of giving too much 
power or substance to that same body.99  Another common 
theme in the Nation’s history has been the quest to create 
a military that “looks like” American society.  This is 
presumably to quell the fear of a standing army.  If 
society shares a common ground with the military, it will 
either avoid conflicts of interest or a military subculture 
of “violent minded” individuals that would rise up against 
the people.100  “Political legitimacy is most commonly 
associated with geographic representation because of 
presumed regional differences in attitudes toward the 
military (Eitelberg, 1979).”101   
From a civilian point-of-view, those needs have formed 
the genesis for the quest for political legitimacy.  For 
the military, political legitimacy is crucial to obtain 
funding, aid, and comfort from the Nation’s citizens.  
Additionally, ensuring more geographical representation 
would be more likely to produce political leaders with 
military backgrounds and experience who would “grasp the 
complexities of defense policy [through their] first-hand 
 
99 David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, “America's Military 
Population,” Population Bulletin, 59 (4), 3-40 (December, 2004): 1-2.  
100  U.S. Congressional Budget Office, The All-Volunteer Military:  
Issues and Performance, The Congress of the U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 11. 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/83xx/doc8313/07-19-MilitaryVol.pdf (accessed 
February 26, 2008). 
101 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 15. 
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experience with the military.”102  Yet, in terms of enlisted 
accessions, the southern United States continues to be 
overrepresented and the northeast continues to be 
underrepresented.  “The representation ratio (percentage of 
accessions divided by percentage of 18-24 year-olds from 
the region) for active accessions from the South was 1.2, 
compared to 0.7 for the Northeast, 0.9 for the North 
Central, and 1.0 for the West.”103  This unbalanced 
distribution may have a negative impact on both the 
civilian and military needs for political legitimacy.   
D. SOCIAL EQUITY 
In contrast, social equity has been a relatively 
recent concern with respect to military service.  There are 
countless examples of inequality and discrimination in the 
Nation’s history.  Consequently, these inequities have 
characterized its military institutions.  But the United 
States has evolved into a socially conscious society well 
on its way to achieving equal opportunity and social 
equity.  Understandably, the military has paralleled, and 
often outpaced, the society of which it is a small but 
vital component. 
The concern of social equity is centered on the issue 
of the “burden” of service.104  The element of social equity 
becomes increasingly important to society in a time of war 
 
102 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 2. 
103 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness 
(OSD(P&R)), FY 2005, Population Representation in the Military 
Services, DefenseLink.mil, vii.  
http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2004/index.html (accessed: 
February 2008) 
104 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 8. 
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when burdens appear to outweigh benefits.  The argument is 
that the physical dangers and personal sacrifice of 
military service are endured by the poor and minorities in 
higher proportion to their representation in society as a 
whole.  This hypothesis is supported with historical 
anecdotes referencing military exemptions that range from 
paying a substitute to serve on one’s behalf to waivers of 
service for college students -- all of which favor the 
wealthy and privileged.105 
On the surface, the unequal burden hypothesis appears 
to continue to be true.  The 2007 CBO study, however, 
showed this situation to be diminishing:  African Americans 
were still overrepresented in the force, but 
underrepresented in new accessions and the “CBO analysis 
suggests that youths are represented…at all socioeconomic 
levels.  However, young people from the lowest income and 
highest income families are less likely to be represented 
in the enlisted force than their peers.”106  This appears to 
refute the claim that the very poor are shouldering the 
majority of the burden.  Additionally, “black recruits were 
more likely to come from the highest black family incomes; 
a change from earlier in the decade.”107  This suggests that 
the assertion of “economic conscription”108 of minorities 
may be overstated.   
Furthermore, representation in the military does not 
necessarily equate to “burden” in terms of physical danger 
 
105 CBO, The All-Volunteer Military, 3-5.   
106 CBO, The All-Volunteer Military, 30. 
107 CBO, The All-Volunteer Military, 29.   
108 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 9. 
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and risk of death.  In an investigation of the racial and 
ethnic makeup of the combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan through December 2006, the 2007 Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) study found that while representation 
in those theaters was an accurate reflection of the racial 
and ethnic representation in the force, “white service 
members have a higher representation in combat operations 
(75[%]) than in the force as a whole (68[%]), whereas black 
service members have a lower representation in those 
occupations (13[%]) than in the overall force (19[%]) …. 
Data on fatalities indicate that minorities are not 
(emphasis added) being killed in those operations at a 
greater rate than their representation in the force.  
Rather, fatalities of white service members have been 
higher than their representation in the force (76[%] of 
deaths in those two theaters through December 2006).”109  
But even if the burdens of military service are 
disproportionately shouldered by certain groups, the 
individuals in those groups receive benefits that might not 
be available elsewhere.110  Even if the claim of economic 
conscription, where underprivileged youth are forced to 
choose between enlistment and unemployment is valid, the 
alternative may be much worse:  unemployment is the only 
answer.111  
Another benefit to military service is the absence of 
gender discrimination:  “Sixteen percent of female officers 
and 34 percent of enlisted women are black compared with 9 
 
109 CBO, The All-Volunteer Military, IX. 
110 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 11. 
111 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 10-11. 
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percent of male officers and 20 percent of enlisted men… 
many black women see the military as providing greater 
opportunities and benefits than the civilian labor 
market.”112 
The numbers on recruitment do not tell the whole 
story.  In fact, when the career force is considered, a 
different representation tale is told.  While African 
Americans show an increase in proportions from accessions 
to force structure, women and Hispanics show a decrease.  
This reflects a disparity in what drives enlistment with 
what drives retention.  Women show a lower propensity to 
reenlist.  If the goal is to raise the proportion of women, 
or at least maintain the present level, the military has 
two options:  recruit more women to account for the higher 
non-reenlistments (a costly proposition) or institute 
policies to retain more women.   
There are limits to the degree to which the military 
should strive to achieve social equity, however.  The 
nature of its business rightfully excludes certain members 
of society.  The aged, infirm, and the young are 3 groups 
who are completely unrepresented in the military.  This is 
because the cost of their presence in terms of lost 
military effectiveness would far outweigh the benefits to 
social equity.  
E. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 
Approximate representation in terms of Social Equity 
and Political Legitimacy is desirable and necessary, but 
only up to the point where it begins to hinder military 
 
112 Segal and Segal, “America's Military Population,” 19. 
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effectiveness.  Determining where that point lies is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  History, however, has shown that 
military effectiveness must take precedence over the desire 
for social equity and political legitimacy when these goals 
are conflicting. 
Examples of this trade-off abound.  Women represent 
almost 50% of the eligible population, yet comprise 
slightly less than 15% of the active duty force.  Since the 
statutory ceiling on the percentage of women in the force 
was lifted in 1972, there has been a very slow and 
calculated increase in the proportion of women who serve.  
Failure to do so would have produced extreme logistical 
difficulties and hindered the military’s ability to achieve 
its mission.  Women are still forbidden to serve in 
approximately 20% of all military positions including 
ground combat units.113  The failure to require women to 
register for the draft underscores the negative effect that 
perfect representation would have on military 
effectiveness.  This illustrates the military’s deliberate 
“correction” of social inequity to reflect current 
attitudes and priorities while preserving military 
effectiveness. 
Minimum education, physical, and moral standards are 
required for enlistment.  Relaxing these standards would 
most likely increase the level of representation of certain 
groups, but at a cost to effectiveness that is unacceptable 
to decision-makers.  The 1989 CBO report shows that more 
than 90% of total-force recruits were high school graduates 
compared with the less than 80% graduation rate of their 
 
113 Segal and Segal, “America's Military Population,” 18. 
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civilian counterparts.  Additionally, a force that 
perfectly represented the Nation in terms of aptitude would 
include 23% of the Nation’s youths who scored between 10 
and 30 on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).  
Currently, the service-wide average is less than 10% of 
those individuals.  United States law forbids joining by 
those that score below 10 on the AFQT.  Education and 
aptitude are currently the best measures of effectiveness 
available.  Therefore: “military effectiveness now argues 
for maintaining the clearly unrepresentative nature, in 
terms of education and test scores, of the recruits being 
brought in under the All Volunteer Force [which is 
unrepresentative in those terms].”114  “In 2006, 69[%] of 
recruits scored at or above the [50th] percentile [category 
IIIA and above], relative to the overall United States 
youth population.”115  This assertion is supported by the 
CBO’s 2007 report that states that the percentage of 
enlistees with High School Diplomas continues to outpace 
the civilian population by the same degree. 
F. ACCESSION REPRESENTATION VERSUS FORCE REPRESENTATION 
Certainly, recruitment representation is important 
when analyzing the demographic shape of today’s military.  
It, however, only tells part of the story.  The make-up of 
the career force is equally, if not more, important and is 
a related consequence of the composition of accessions.  
Today’s career force does not look the same as the 
accessions that feed it, however.  There is a disconnect 
between incentives to join the military and decisions to 
 
114 CBO, Social Representation in the Military, 8. 
115 CBO, The All-Volunteer Military, 15-16. 
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stay in the military.  African Americans are under-
represented in terms of accessions -- 13% in 2005 --, but 
overrepresented in terms of career force -- 19% in 2006 -- 
compared to 14% of the overall population.  Women joined at 
a rate of 16.5%, yet, in 2004, the total force percentage 
was only 14.8%.  In 2004, 12.9% of accessions were 
Hispanic, yet only 9.8% of the total force was represented, 
compared to that ethnicity contributing to 16.4% of the 
eligible population.116  In force shaping endeavors, the 
Navy must determine why this disparity occurs and strive to 
provide reenlistment incentives to achieve the optimal mix.   
G. CRAM’S FORCE-DIVERSIFICATION POTENTIAL 
For a 25% retention rate, 151 of 604 Sailors were 
retained under all retention mechanisms simulated.  Under 
the CRAM auction, depending on the NMIs offered, a 
different set of Sailors was retained.  This contrasts with 
those retained under the strictly monetary retention 
auction.  Some Sailors were present in both groups 
(overlap).  For example, when all 13 NMIs were offered, the 
overlap was 45 Sailors.  This means 106 different Sailors 
were retained by offering NMIs.  But, who are these Sailors 
and how does their retention affect the demographic 
composition of the fleet? 
To test the effects of offering different combinations 
of NMIs, five CRAM auctions were simulated.  The 
researchers adjusted the offerings to produce the largest 
positive increase in the following groups:  females, 
African Americans (black), Hispanics, Sailors with an 
 
116 OSD(P&R), Population Representation in the Military. 
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Associate’s Degree or higher, and Sailors age 27 and under.  
As costing data was unknown, the cost of incentives was 
assumed to be zero to fully compare relative values.  The 
25% retention rate was used to capture the individuals with 
the highest values for the individual NMIs. 
The sample was too small and narrow to prove any 
differences statistically significant or applicable to the 
entire enlisted force, but the findings deserve mention and 
further study.  Appendix E contains results of selected NMI 
combinations and their impacts on representation by gender, 
race/ethnicity, education level, and age.  Note:  there are 
cases when the results from this sample show a decrease in 
retention of certain protected groups.  Policy makers must 
be careful to ensure that offering NMIs does not have an 
adverse impact.  
1. Gender 
By offering choice of homeport and billet only, CRAM 
produced the largest positive change in female 
representation.  This group increased five percentage 
points from 16% of those retained to 21%.  This resulted in 
just over a 30% increase in retention.  This implies, for 
this sample, homeport and billet choices are the most 
valuable non-monetary incentives to these women.  While 
sabbatical, telecommuting, and compressed workweek did not 
produce the largest increase, the inclusion of these 






Table 7.    Gender Representation with CRAM 
Gender SRB 
Only 










Female 16% 21% 19% 18% 19% 17%








In this sample, almost 53% of the females were ACs.  
Under the monetary auction, the retained female ACs 
represented just over 20% of the females in the sample.  
When the five NMIs listed in Table 5 were offered, the 
female ACs retained represented only 16% of the females in 
the sample.  Put another way, representation of retained 
female FCs increased from just over 5% of the females in 
the sample to almost 11%.  With only choice of homeport and 
billet offered, ACs represented 24% of the females and FCs 
just fewer than 10%.  This may be because the benefits 
offered under sabbatical, telecommuting, and compressed 
workweek are more appealing to FC women as their rate 
spends 70% of its time at sea.  Or it could be that female 
ACs do not find these options necessary or feasible as they 
are in a shore-intensive, fixed-schedule job.  In any case, 
the results may not be applicable to the entire enlisted 
population.  This underscores the necessity of a more 
rigorous analysis involving a larger and more diverse 
sample. 
2. Race/Ethnicity 
Two demographic groups were identified for these 
simulations:  African American (black) and Hispanic.   
a. African American 
Figure 28 compares the results of a monetary only 
auction and a CRAM auction offering choice of homeport, 
compressed workweek and lump sum SRB.  Again, the results 
show an increase in the percentage of blacks retained 
implying, for this sample, that these NMIs are the most 
valuable to this demographic group. 
 
Figure 30.   Black Representation with CRAM 
b. Hispanic 
For Hispanics in this sample, the most valuable 
NMIs appeared to be choice of platform, two-tour geographic 
stability, professional certification and lump sum SRB.  
Figure 31 displays the contrast in representation between 
the monetary only auction simulation and the CRAM auction 
with the above offerings.  The increase in Hispanic 




Figure 31.   Hispanic Representation with CRAM 
3.  Education 
If the Navy is to attract personnel with higher levels 
of education, the results of this sample’s CRAM auction 
suggest that offering a choice of homeport, choice of 
platform, sabbatical, telecommuting, compressed work week, 
a barracks room while on sea duty, and a lump-sum SRB could 
increase the representation of this group.  In this sample, 
the percent of retained Sailors with an Associate’s Degree 
or higher increased from 23% to 36% -- an increase of 52%. 
Figure 32 shows these results. 
 
Figure 32.   Education Level Representation with CRAM 
 
4. Age  
The respondents were grouped into four different age 
groups representing three “generations:” Baby Boomers 
(those over 42), Generation X (age 28-42), and Generation Y 
(age 21-27 and those under 21).  According to the 2005 
Population Representation in the Military Services,117 
Generation Y Sailors comprise 62% of the force; Generation 
X accounts for almost 35%; and the remaining 3% consist of 
Baby Boomers.  The representation of Generation Y Sailors 
will only increase as the Baby Boomers and older Generation 
X Sailors retire.  The sample from the Enlisted Retention 
Survey was almost 57% Generation Y, 40% Generation X, and 
just over 2% Baby Boomers.  
As Figure 33 illustrates, 45% of retained Sailors were 
from Generation Y using a monetary-only approach.  With a 
CRAM auction, offering choice of platform, choice of 
billet, sabbatical, telecommuting, three-tour geographic 
stability, professional certification, compressed work 
week, a barracks room while on sea duty, and lump sum SRB, 
50% of those retained were from this generation. 
 
Figure 33.   Age Representation with CRAM  
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H. SUMMARY 
This chapter demonstrates CRAM’s potential as a force-
diversification tool, although it only addresses diversity 
in terms of retention -- not accessions, attrition, or 
promotion.  It is important to note that CRAM achieves 
enhanced diversity without giving particular retention 
preference to any group.  It simply offers what is most 
important to its members in the hopes of increasing their 
retention. 
The reader should nonetheless be cautioned:  these 
results are not conclusive.  The sample is too small and 
narrow in scope for statistical inference.  The results do, 
however, show CRAM’s potential effect on population 
representation.  
 124
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VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This research addressed the potential retention and 
cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized 
portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to 
influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted 
Sailors. 
The Enlisted Retention Survey and subsequent auction 
simulations showed: 
1. A combinatorial auction mechanism providing 
individualized portfolios of non-monetary and 
monetary incentives, promising a more cost-
effective means to influence 
reenlistment/retention behavior over monetary 
incentives alone. 
2. A way to determine the optimal mix of 
monetary/non-monetary incentives that would be 
both valued by Sailors and cost-effective for the 
Navy. 
3. The auction design that would allow the Navy to 
tailor monetary/non-monetary reenlistment 
incentive packages to individual Sailors while 
simultaneously economizing Navy resources. 
4. The potential cost savings the Navy might expect 
by moving from purely monetary reenlistment 
incentives to a portfolio of monetary/non-
monetary incentives -- if both reenlistment 
incentive programs are optimally designed. 
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5. How population representation might be affected 
by offering these reenlistment incentives. 
This thesis focused on exploring three mechanisms for 
administrating enlisted retention:  a purely monetary 
auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and 
the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).   
The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes 
compared, and their respective strengths and weaknesses 
explored.  CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP 
auctions.  Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25-80% over 
monetary incentives alone.  While the UIP was shown to be 
simpler in implementation than the version of CRAM 
simulated here, the potential for significant deficit (with 
UIP) was illustrated both conceptually and in the 
simulations.  While not the focus of this thesis, CRAM 
auction variants can be designed to simplify implementation 
while retaining the essential CRAM performance 
characteristics as discussed below in the implementation 
section. 
The final product is a retention approach that is 
applicable to any community (enlisted or officer, surface 
or aviation) by simply changing the offerings and 
associated reservation values. 
Additionally, this research addressed the force-
diversifying potential of CRAM.  For the sample used, it 
was shown, that offering certain non-monetary incentives 
changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained.  Due to 
the small sample size, these results are not conclusive, 
but do provide support for further research. 
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Another benefit of CRAM that can perhaps not be 
quantified is the psychological benefits of choice.  By 
creating an environment where Sailors choose the benefits 
that best suit them, they will be encouraged to recognize 
the true composition of their total rewards package and may 
also realize an increase in value by having a voice in 
their compensation.  By allowing Sailors to choose only 
those benefits which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the 
waste associated with unwanted benefits while at the same 
time empowering its members. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
There already exists substantial research that 
supports the effectiveness of a Total Rewards approach to 
compensation.  There is also evidence that an auction 
mechanism to determine proper bonus levels would be 
beneficial to manpower analysts.  This thesis combines 
these two notions into a tool for planners to effectively 
and efficiently manage retention and reenlistment behavior. 
Results from the Enlisted Retention Survey and 
subsequent auction simulations estimate a savings of 




The authors suggest first implementing these auctions 
on a small scale, with one or two ratings, in a pilot 
program.  This approach will allow planners and 
participants to become comfortable with the new system and 
to work out any issues that may arise. 
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The implementation of Navy-wide retention auctions 
would require substantial reworking of the current 
reenlistment system.  To obtain sufficient numbers for each 
auction, mass reenlistment “seasons” would have to be 
established.  A Sailor could still maintain his current end 
of obligated service (EAOS), but he would be required to 
commit to an additional obligated service during the 
reenlistment season prior to his EAOS.  An example of this 
would be to have quarterly reenlistment seasons:  one each 
in January, April, July, and September.  If a Sailor’s EAOS 
was May 8, he would be required to participate in the 
January reenlistment season auction and commit, at that 
time, to reenlisting on or before May 8.  This system would 
have an additional benefit of preventing billet gaps that 
ensue from unplanned EAOS losses. 
The simplest way to implement CRAM would be a 
“cafeteria-style” plan where Sailors are given a menu of 
NMIs along with their associated costs.  Each Sailor would 
be able to select which NMIs he would like included in his 
retention package.  The Sailor would understand that the 
listed cost of any NMI selected would be added to his 
requested SRB amount to determine his total retention cost 
(and, thus, his likelihood of being retained).  Each Sailor 
would be best served only to select the NMIs he believes he 
values as much or more than its cost.  After choosing from 
the available NMIs, each Sailor would then submit a cash 
bid indicating the minimum amount he would require for 
reenlistment given that he would also receive his selected 
NMIs. 
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A further extension of this system is a two-phase 
reenlistment process.  Sailors would bid on the NMIs in an 
open auction for the six months prior to their retention 
season.  After “winning” his provisional NMIs, a Sailor 
would participate in the next season’s retention auction, 
bidding for retention with his individualized package of 
incentives. 
2. Further Research 
Further research is definitely warranted.  The data 
used in the simulations was relatively small (604 
observations) and the scope was relatively narrow (E-6 and 
below Navy ACS and FCs).  The model itself, however, can 
easily be adapted to accommodate a larger sample and more 
diverse group.  
The authors suggest administering a Navy-wide Enlisted 
Retention Survey similar to the one in Appendix A to obtain 
value distributions that can be used for statistical 
inference. 
Accurate cost data is also essential to fully 
determine the cost saving scope of this mechanism.  
Research is presently ongoing to discover theses costs.  
Pilot programs, as suggested in the implementation section, 
would also provide more accurate cost data. 
D. A FINAL WORD 
Providing a Total Rewards package consisting of 
monetary and non-monetary benefits individually tailored to 
meet the needs of each individual Sailor is a lofty goal.  
It, however, is one that is certainly attainable and well 
worth the effort.  Through the use of CRAM, the Navy can 
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empower its members by giving them a voice in their 
compensation and save itself potentially hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in wasted benefits:  truly a “win-win” 
situation. 
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APPENDIX B. SRB AND NMI VALUE DISTRIBUTIONS 
For presentation purposes, all figures were truncated 
at 40% on the vertical axis.  On the horizontal axis, the 
SRB Requirements Distribution display was truncated at 
$150,000 and the Value Distribution displays were truncated 
at $30,000.  Percent of Responses was calculated using all 
observations. 
Mean and maximum values were calculated excluding 
outliers where indicated (*).  Outliers were defined as SRB 
Requirements of $500,000 and above and NMI Values of 
$100,000 and above.  There were three observations that 
contained outlier values.  There were seven individual NMI 
outlier values:  one each for homeport choice, billet 
choice, telecommuting, three-tour geographic stability, and 





































































Mean*      47,978
Mode (13%)      50,000 
25th Percentile      25,000 
Median       45,000 
75th Percentile      70,000 
90th Percentile       89,000 
95th Percentile     100,000 


























































Mean*        6,358
Mode (33%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median         5,000 
75th Percentile      10,000 
90th Percentile       20,000 
95th Percentile       25,000 


























































Mean*       2,563 
Mode (59%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile        2,136 
90th Percentile       10,000 
95th Percentile       10,000 

























































Mean*        5,357
Mode (38%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median         2,000 
75th Percentile      10,000 
90th Percentile       15,000 
95th Percentile       20,000 


























































Mean        4,706
Mode (59%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile        5,000 
90th Percentile       15,000 
95th Percentile       25,000 

























































Mean*        5,862
Mode (47%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                1 
75th Percentile        7,500 
90th Percentile       20,000 
95th Percentile       25,000 

























































Mean        4,609
Mode (47%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile        5,000 
90th Percentile       12,800 
95th Percentile       20,000 


























































Mean*        6,620
Mode (44%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median         1,000 
75th Percentile      10,000 
90th Percentile       20,000 
95th Percentile       35,000 

























































Mean*        3,627
Mode (56%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile        5,000 
90th Percentile       10,000 
95th Percentile       20,000 

























































Mean        3,289
Mode (55%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile        5,000 
90th Percentile       10,000 
95th Percentile       15,000 




















































































































Mean        6,678
Mode (43%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median         1,000 
75th Percentile      10,000 
90th Percentile       20,000 
95th Percentile       30,000 

























































Mean          628
Mode (81%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile               0 
90th Percentile            500 
95th Percentile         4,798 
Maximum      25,000 
Mean        1,433
Mode (80%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile               0 
90th Percentile         5,000 
95th Percentile       10,000 

























































Mean        4,400
Mode (80%)               0 
25th Percentile               0 
Median                0 
75th Percentile        5,000 
90th Percentile       10,000 
95th Percentile       20,000 
Maximum      90,000 
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APPENDIX C. VARYING PERCENTILE (ALL POSITIVE) COST 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
25% Retention. 
Overlay Charts and CRAM Savings over Monetary Only: 
 
Universal(1)=UIP(0);Universal(2)=UIP(50);Universal(3)=UIP(100) 
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APPENDIX D. VARYING PERCENTILE COST (HIGH 
POSITIVE) SIMULATION RESULTS 
25% Retention. 
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APPENDIX E. DIVERSITY CHARTS 

































































































































Maximum Increase in Representation:  Female  
















































































































Maximum Increase in Representation:  African American 
(black) 

















































































































Maximum Increase in Representation:  Hispanic 
NMIs Offered: Platform, 2-tour Geographic Stability, 

















































































































Maximum Increase in Representation:  Education, at or above 
Associate’s Degree 
NMIs Offered: Homeport, Platform, Sabbatical, 


















































































































Maximum Increase in Representation:  Generation Y 
NMIs Offered:  Platform, Billet, Sabbatical, Telecommuting, 
3-tour Geographic Stability, Professional Certification, 
Compressed Week, Barracks Room at sea, Lump Sum SRB 
 































































































Bock, Paul B., “The Sequential Self-Selection Auction  
Mechanism for Selective Reenlistment Bonuses:  
Potential Cost Savings to the U.S. Marine Corps,” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
 
Chief of Naval Operations, 2008 Stay Navy Campaign 
Guidance, DTG 101233Z December 2007 (Washington, D.C.: 
2007). 
 
Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVINST 1160.8A, Department of 
the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
(Washington, D.C.: 2007). 
 
Chief of Naval Operations, Pay and Compensation/Stay Navy  
Campaign, DTG 212124Z MAR 08 (Washington, D.C.: 2008).  
 
Cook, Benjamin M., “Using a Second-Price Auction to Set  
Military retention Bonus Levels:  An Application to 
the Australian Army,” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008). 
 
Corporate Leadership Council, “Royal Bank of Scotland’s  
Flexible Benefits Package.” Corporate Executive Board. 
www.corporateleadershipcouncil.com (accessed July 16, 
2008). 
 
Corporate Leadership Council, “Total Rewards Philosophy  
Components and Statements,” Corporate Executive Board. 
www.corporateleadershipcouncil.com (accessed October 
24, 2008). 
 
Coughlan, Peter J., “Introduction to Auction Economics,”  
(lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
November 29, 2004).  
 
Coughlan, Peter J., William R. Gates, and Brooke M.  
Zimmerman, “The Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism (CRAM):  Creating Individualized Monetary & 
Non-monetary Incentive Packages (presentation, Defence 
and Economics Security Workshop, Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada, November 6, 2008). 
 174
Denmond, Constance M., Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis,  
and Christopher R. Zegley, “Combinatorial Auction 
Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare 
Incentives,” (MBA professional report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007). 
 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor  
Economics Theory and Public Policy, 10th ed. (New 
York: Addison-Wesley, 2008).  
 




(accessed February 12, 2008). 
 
Ferguson, Mark E., VADM, USN, “Keynote Speaker,” (Eighth  
Annual Navy Workforce and Research Conference, 
Rosslyn, Virginia, May 5, 2008). 
 
Hansen , Michael L. and Jennie W. Wenger, “Is the Pay  
Responsiveness of Enlisted Personnel Decreasing?” 
Defence and Peace Economics 16, no.1 (2005). 
 
Hansen, Michael L. and Martha E. Koopman, Military  
Compensation Reform in the Department of the Navy, CNA 
Research Memorandum D00012889.A2 (Alexandria, 
Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 2005).   
 
Hattiangadi, Anita U., Private Sector Benefit Offerings in  
the Competition for High skill Recruits, CNA Research 
Memorandum D0003563.A2 (Alexandria, Virginia: Center 
for Naval Analysis, 2001). 
 
Hudson, Daniel P., “Utilizing Auctions as a Force Shaping  
Tool to Provide Voluntary Separation Incentives to 
Naval Personnel,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2006). 
 
Kraus, Amanda B. N., Diana S. Lien, and Bryan K. Orme, The  
Navy Survey on Reenlistment and Quality of Service:  
Using Choice-Based Conjoint To Quantify Relative 
Preferences for Pay and Nonpay Aspects of Naval 
Service, CNA Research Memorandum D0008416.A2 
(Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, 
2003). 
 175
Norton, William J., “Using an Experimental Approach to  
Improving the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program,” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and  
Readiness, Military Compensation Background Papers,  
6th ed. (Washington, D.C.:  United Sates Government 
Printing Office: 2005).  
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Military_Comp.pdf 
(accessed October 25, 2008). 
 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and  
Readiness (OSD(P&R)), “FY 2005, Population 
Representation in the Military Services,” 
DefenseLink.mil. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2004/index.htm
l (accessed February 2008) 
 
Roughead, Gary, ADM, USN, “Diversity Policy, 28 Feb 2008.”  
Chief of Naval Operations, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/leadership/ldrDisplay.asp
?m=253 (accessed April 14, 2008). 
 
Roughead, Gary, ADM, USN, “Keynote Address,” (Surface Navy  
Association Symposium, Arlington, Virginia, January 
15, 2008). 
 
Segal, David R. and Mady Wechsler Segal, “America's 
Military Population,” Population Bulletin, 59(4), 3-40 
(December 2004).  
 
Tan, Pei Yin, “Simulating the Effectiveness of an  
Alternative Salary Auction Mechanism,” (Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006). 
 
TED: The Editor’s Desk, “Flexible Benefits and  
reimbursement accounts, April 4, 2007,” Bureau of 
Labor and Statistics. 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/apr/wk1/art03.txt 
(accessed October 27, 2008). 
 
Tremblay, Michel, Bruno Sire, Annie Pelchat. 1998. “A Study  
of the Determinants and of the Impact of Flexibility 
on Employee Benefits Satisfaction,” Human Relations 
51, no. 5 (May 1). http://www.proquest.com (accessed 
July 20, 2008). 
 176
U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Social  
Representation in the U.S. Military, The Congress of 
the United Sates Congressional Budget Office, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989).  
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6746/89-CBO-044.pdf 
(accessed February 26, 2008). 
 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office, The All-Volunteer  
Military:  Issues and Performance, The Congress of the 
United Sates Congressional Budget Office, (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007). 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/83xx/doc8313/07-19-
MilitaryVol.pdf (accessed February 26, 2008). 
 
U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal  
Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates Submission, 
Justification of Estimates, February 2008, Military 
Personnel, Navy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2008). 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/09PRES/MPN_Book.pdf 
(accessed November 6, 2008). 
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel:   
Management and Oversight of Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus Program Needs Improvement (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2002). 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03149.pdf (accessed 
February 17, 2008). 
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel:   
DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel 
Recruitment and Retention Challenges (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005). 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03149.pdf (accessed 
February 17, 2008). 
 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Military  
Personnel:  Active Duty Benefits Reflect Changing 
Demographics, but Opportunities Exist to Improve, 
Report, GAO-02-935 (Washington, D.C.: Government 







Van Boening, Mark, Tanja F. Blackstone, Michael MckKee, and 
     Elisabet Rutstrom.  “Benefit Packages and Individual 
Behavior:  Choices Over Discrete Goods with Multiple 











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 179
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Director, Center for Human Resource Excellence 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. OPNAV N1Z, N104, N132 
Washington, DC 
 
5. Professor William Gates 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
6. Professor Peter Coughlan 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
7. LT Brooke Zimmerman 
Washington, DC 
